The Origin of the South Sea Company, 1710-1714 by Jenks, Leland H.
THE ORIGIN OF THE SOUTH SEA COMPANY. 
1710 - 1714. 
by 
LELAND H. JENKS, M. A. 
A Thesis submitted in the Department of 
History in the University of Kansas 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements 
for the degree of Master of Arts. 
Approved, May 18,1914. 
Professor of European History. 
Lawrence,Kansas: 1914. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS* 
o 
pages 
Chapter I.- The Political Background 1-17. 
Whig Overthrow in 1710 . . . . 
Critical political situation 5. 
Fear of Jacobite influence among Tories 7. 
Harley's position, in Tory party.. 11. 
Attempt to maintain non-partisan ministry.. . . .13 . 
Political factiori* . 13* 
Summary 16* 
Chapter II.-A Troublesome Legacy 18-31. 
Public finance under Godolphin 18. 
Depreciation of unsecured bills 33* 
Origin of these debts... 35* 
Necessity of making security for them. . . . . . . . 31* 
Chapter III.Framing the South sea Project 31-61. 
The Tory programme . 31* 
The problem of taxation-past difficulties. . . . 33* 
Budget for 1711 36* 
Authorship of South sea plan 38* 
Analysis of the a c t . . . . . 42* 
Its dual nature a weakness 51. 
Procedure in passing Parliament 53* 
Chapter IV.-Fiscal Usefulness of the Company 63-70* 
Stimulating effect on credit 63* 
Objections of government creditors 64* 
Payment of claims in stock 66. 
Borrowing on stock as security 67* 
Table of Contents,con.— 
Chapter V.- The South sea Trade and Utrecht 71-103* 
Golden expectations in south s e a s . . . . . . . 71* 
Early projects for colonization 73* 
West Indies in the pending wax 74* 
Character of trade anticipated. 77. 
French control of Spanish carrying trade 80. 
The guaranty of April 22,1711 82. 
Matthew prior's Negotiations 84* 
Promise of the Assiento to England 86. 
Dutch jealousy of South sea Company 88. 
Search for compromise - Dutch give in . 91* 
Negotiation of contract with Spain 95* 
The Assiento Contract.. 98* 
Final ratification 102. 
Chapter VI.- Some Internal History 104~131. 
Subscription of stock - early plans 104. 
First board of directors — ^rthur Moore 106. 
Charter from the Queen, September 8,1711 108. 
Inactivity of c°mpany - grant of perpetual 
charter 109. 
plan to trade in 1713 - intei&ml condition.... 11 J* 
Assiento awarded to the Company 114. 
The Queen1 s reserved quarter 116. 
Plan8 for division * .* . 117* 
Struggle to adjust relations - the Company 
declines to trade*.. . . * 119* 
Queen m akes supplementary grant * * . . . 131. 
Suspicion directed at Moore 123. 
Expulsion from the directorate. 133. 
Investigation in the Lords 125. 
South Sea court accepts the Assiento 138. 
A forward glance — Conclusion 139. 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
o 
Source material made use of -
Reports of the Historical Manuscripts Commission* 
London, Especially the Portland ^^uBOXJ^tm. 
Lords Journals,,Volume XIX. 
Journals of the House of Commons. Volumes XVI-XVII* 
Statutes-at-Large. Danby Pickering,ed.Cambridge.1764. 
Cobbett: Bartiamentary History of Tmgland from the 
Earliest Period to the Year 1803.London.1810. 
A Collection of Scarce and Valuable Tracts on the most 
Interesting and entertaining Subjects...from the 
library of the late Lord goners« Walter scott,ed. 
London.1815. 
Writings of William Paterson....edit.by Saxe Bannister. 
London 1859. 3 T O I S . 
Inventory of the South Sea Di^ttictors.London. 1731* 
William Coxe:Memoirs of the Duke of Marlborough with 
kis original corresponded^.3 vols.London. 1886* 
:Memoirs, of the Life and Administration of 
Sir Robert Walpole. 3 vols. London. 1798* 
The Harleian Miscellany London-lfiiry 
Bibliography,oon.—— 
Calendar of Treasury papers,1708-14;1714-30. London, 
1879. 
Adam Anderson: His tori oal and chronological Deduction 
of the Origin of commerce.....(1763) 4 vols.London.1801« 
Anderson was a clerk in the south Sea House for forty years 
before writing his history and speaks from personal knowl-
edge of the success of Sits activities. 
Letters and Dispatches of John Chi rchill,1st Duke of 
Marlborough.1703-13.ed.by sir George Murray.5rols.London. 
1845. 
James Macpherson: original Papers......London.1775. 
Jonathan Swift:Prose works.ed. by Temple $oott. 13 rols. 
London.1900. 
: Cor r e spjgftde no e. ed. by F. Firing ton Ball. 
6 vols. London.1911. 
Henry,Viscount Bolingbroke: WorEs.8 vols.London.1809. 
:Letter to sir filliara windham 
in Cassell'B National Library.London.1889, 
Narcissus Luttrell:A prief Relation pf ^tata ftffairs from 
1678 to 1714. 6 vols. Oxford.1857. 
Bishop Burnet: History of His Own Tirae/.6 vols.Oxford. 
1833. 
Bibliography,con. 
Secondary works referred to-
All standard ijitetories relating to the period in 
question have been consulted. In addition treatises 
tracing special phases of historical development have 
been read. .Among the works referred to may be cited: 
Hunt & poole:poliftlioal History of England. 13 vols. 
London.1909. 
Mahon: Hi story of England 7 vols.London. 
1853. 
Cambridge Modern Histpcy. >Tew York. 1903. 
J.H.Burton:History of the Reign of oueen Anne.3 voi 
in one.Edinburgh and London.1883. 
Henry Hal lam: constitutional History of gnglarf-c 3 
vols. Everyman Library.London and New York. 
StepJien Powell:History of Taxation and Taxes in 
England. 4 vols. London.4888. 
A. Andreades:History of the Bank of ^ngland.London. lflOl 
M » 
E.S.Rosooe: Robert Harlev.Earl of Oxford.New York. 
1903. 
W. Sichel:Bolingbroke and his Times.New.York.1901, 
THE ORIGIN OF THE SOUTH SEA COMPANY 
— 0 
Chapter One* 
THE POLITICAL BACKGROUND. 
* tt* tt* ft* n* n* n* n* ti* 
Tke establishment of the south sea company was 
directly related to the ovefthrow of the whig ministry im 
the fall of 1710, In the political,financial and ecomomic 
situation created by the governmental upheaval, the project 
took definite shape. Its authorization came as a vital step 
im the solution by Robert Harley of the problems which oonfro nt-
ed his ministry. 
The causes of the ^hig overthrow are lately immater-
ial. Earl Godolphin had been ia power as Lord Treasurer of 
l?;ngl(|md since 1703, Starting as a Tory, his political tactics 
had brought him by 1708 to a radical Whig position, supported 
by a threatening Whig majority in Parliament he forced the 
Que em to comsent to a reorganization of the ministry which 
eliminated from power the last adherent of the Tory policy. 
2» 
For the first time in English history the government was 
in the hands of a single party for two years. England was 
not yet ready for party government. And this fact,together 
with the really preponderant Tory population, would account 
in a large degree for a public sentiment that could view 
with tolerance and active sympathy a change in the person-
elle of the government. 
Even more potent an influence perhaps was the 
general discontent with the war. For ten years England 
had been sending men and money to the gontinent to fight 
battles from which it seemed she could not hope for 
immediate gain. The war had been a considerable hindrance 
to commerce. It was rapidly exhausting the stock of surplus 
labor for agriculture and industry, jnd upon the very men 
who bore the brunt of these consequences of the war there 
fell the chief burden of the high taxes it occasioned. The 
landed class and the mercantile interests felt that they 
were paying for a war the pti$oipal profit of which was 
for money-dealers and bankers,who largely escaped taxational) 
p 
(1) "To what end is it carried on?" queried a Tory pamphlet-
eer. "Is it not merely to gratify the felonious humours of a 
company of plunderers of the nation?...When trading is al-
most ruined,our merchants undone,and none enriched but a 
parcel?" of Jew, Dutch, French and English stockjobbers,*tis 
high time for ^ngland to redress this national distemper.." 
The Miserable Gase of poor Old England Fairly Stated! Somers 
Tracts,XIII,305-13. Cf.Bolingbroke*s Letter to Sir William 
Windham. 33-3. 
3. 
In consequence a strong reaction in favor of peace had set 
in. Thwarted in the hope for peace to come from Gertruyden-
berg, public opinion fixed the blame for the failure upon 
the Whig ministry and the Duke of Marlborough. Peace with 
France, and a change of ministry to procure it, were 
genuine demands of the people* 
One event of the foremost importance about which 
crystallized the opposition of the High Church forces to 
the Whig ministry was the Sacheverell prosecution. The 
trial of this popular preacher on a charge of high treason 
roused public sentiment as few occurrences during the reig^ 
of Queen Anne. Although convicted on a close vote in the 
House of Lords, Sacheverell was hailed all over England as 
a popular hero, as a champion of the prerogative of the 
Crown. The statements on which he had been convicted, 
constituting the doctrine of fpassive obedience1, formed a 
party issue that for the moment seemed vital enough to 
compel an alignment of all England on a matter of fundament-
al principle. 
But if these were causes operating throughout 
England to welcome a change of ministry, the change itself 
was brought about by pettier influences exerted in the 
private household of the Queen. Mrs.Abigail Masham, a 
4. 
relative and politioal ally of Robert Harley, kad secured 
the favor of the Queen, displacing the Da chess of Marlborough 
who was a staunch whig. Through her persistent efforts 
an 'inside1 Tory reaction had begun to Manifest itself 
early in 1710 through the royal appointments. In January, 
Lord Rivers, a friend of parley, was made Lord Lieutenant of 
the Tower over the protest of Marlborough. Soon after Colonel 
Hill,Mrs.MaWiam1 s brother, was given an important regimscrbj;. 
In April, the of Shrewsbury was forced on Godolphin as 
Lord Chamberlain,becoming the real mouthpiece of the Queen 
in the government for the next few months. This able 
politician exerted himself to bring his Tory friends into 
office with him. In June, the Earl of guilder land was displaced 
as secretary of state by Lord Dartmouth, a direct slap at 
Marlborough who was his father-in-law. The feeling had 
been carefully fostered in the Queentthit the great whig 
ministers were encroaching on her prerogative, And finally 
the conviction that she was being made the tool of men who 
stopped not at personal insult in maintaining thoir powor 
in the government led her to the dismissal of Godolphin on 
August 8,1710.(1) This was the decisive step in the whig 
(1) Faults on Both Sides ,1710, (probably by Defoe) Somers 
Tracts,XII,696. Macpherson papers,11,189-91.nr.Hutton to 
Elector,gept.5,1710. Port.MSS.11,213. Frankland-Astley-Russell 
MSS. ,301-3. 
5. 
overthrow. The Treasury was placed in coranfcssion two 
days later, and R<foert Harley holding the office of 
Chancellor of the Exchequer became active head of the 
government from August 10* 
It was a complicated problem which Harley faced 
as he resumed the reins of office. On the one hand he 
was confronted by a political situation requiring the 
utmost delicacy and tact; on the other he partly inherited, 
partly precipitated a financial problem the solution of 
which called for rare statesmanship and ability. The two 
conditions reacted on each other. Political fears raised 
by Jacibite alarms helped to unsettle public credit. The 
shock caused by the fall of stocks and tightening of 
# 
money furnished ample grounds for partisan attack. Between 
the Scylla and Charybdis of political suicide and national 
bankruptcy, Harley was to steer for an honorable close 
of the pending war - the sreat positive aim of the Tory 
party. 
The political situation was critical both at home 
and abroad. There was the matter of reconciling the ex-
treme factional heats of the more radical members of the two 
strong parties at home. And there was the even more delicato 
question of presenting a front in foreign affairs that 
would at once convince the allies of -pritish good faith, 
and make evident to France the determination of England not 
to falter in her military operations. This latter problem 
of England's foreign relations overhung like a cloud the 
consideration of every domestic issue of the day. It was 
the effect of home discord on the conduct of the allies and 
the conclusion of a speedy peace that was dwelt on by the 
whigs who opposed an$> change in the ministry. It was the 
fact that England1 s army was in the field, requiring its 
weekly subsistence that intensified the financial crisis. 
It was the need of assuring the Dutch and other allies that 
the prosent ministry would carry out past engagements that 
made the settling of public credit so imperative and gave 
shape to Harley1 s measures to place the finances on a secure 
footing. The problem of the French war could only be solved 
by a skilful and speedy adjustment of the other matters of 
politics and finance. 
The fall of Godolphin brought no cessation of the 
political fevor that had raged in England since the 
Sacheverell affair. It only renewed party controversy and 
7. 
debate. However much tke change had been demanded in tome 
quarters, the feeling prevailed among many moderate Tories 
as well as among the whigs that it was not the wisest policy 
to 'swap horsos while crossing the stream1• Men spoke of 
the "ingratitude of disgracing those that had courted so 
much and have been the instruments of gaining greater 
glory to the Queen and nation than any of our former kings 
or greatest conquerors arrived at" , ( l ) "Is this a time", 
inquire* a clever Whig pamphleteer disguised a® an 'Honest 
Tory1, "Is this a time for such a total alteration as must 
shake the confidence off friends and inspire the enemy with 
hopes?" (3) The effect which the change might exercise on 
the credit of the nation and on her military prestige was 
indeed a legitimate question. 
Fertit&ps more fanciful were the fears which wer© 
rai sod and carefully spread abroad regarding the danger of 
a Jacobite restoration. The anxiety of the Tory party for 
peace with Franco,led to the charge that French influences 
supported the change of ministry; and the query was 
(1) Port.MSS., IV, 573-5. R.Monckton to Harley, A*g. 33,1710 • 
For similar expressions see ibid,11,315. Also Swift Corrosp., 
1,187-8. etc. 
(3) Thoughts of an Honest Tory. 133.0.In Somers Tracts,XII, 
673-Tl 
8. 
insinuatingly advanced, "Hpw much was it worth to them?"(l) 
wild rumors of the Pretender's coming were circulated, 
especially among the more credulous* Even wiser heads seem 1s 
have entertained the notion advanced that t|Le Queen was 
planning to retire in favor of her brother.(3) Contemporary 
literature is full of references to a 1 spungo1 which was 
to wipe away ihe debts of the nation. (3) No doubt tho 
majority of the rank and file of the Whigs actually believed 
that the elevation of a Tory ministry to power was somehow 
in the interest of the Pretender and against the Protest-
ant Succession. 
This belief found support in the actions of many 
of the Tories themselves. While nothing can be more certain 
than the fact that Harloy and his followers had no such 
purpose in view at the time, it is just as certain that 
many ardent Tories entertained such hopes. In Scotland, 
for instance, a Tory was almost synonymous with A Jacobito. 
( 1 ) Queries.1710. Somers Tracts,XII,667-70. 
(2) "The Highlanders look not for their Saviour's coming 
with more certainty than that of the Pro tenderPort.MSS., 
IV,629-31.Defoe to Harley,Nov.35,1710. Cf.also ibid,IV,634, 
and Mar & Kellie MSS.,484-5. 
(5) This allusion seems to have been originated by Defoe,who 
later found occasion to refute his own epijram. 
9. 
The Pretender1* health was openjrf drunk by leading Tories, 
and four avowed Jacobite peer* were *ent to Parliament 
from the North. (1) In England proper the manifestations of 
Jacobite *entiment were not so open. However the warmth of 
enthusiasm with which the Tory squires greeted their return 
to favor was sufficiently terrifying. Over their cups, 
the gentry warm with wine talked high and loud of 'changes1 
to be made, 'inquiries1 to be carried on, 'revenge1 to bo 
obtained. High Tories boasted that now they could do what 
they pleased with the Queen and that the entire government 
was at their mercy. (3) They demanded the spoils of war. 
It seemod evident to staunch Whigs that fthe old mad party1 
had come back to power, whether it brought over James the 
Third or no, the fear was genuine that a new Parliament 
made up of such intemperate statesmen might not feel bound 
in the least by past obligations. The credit and honor of 
England might vanish at a breath.(3) 
(1) Port.MSS. IV, 539-31. Defoe to Harloy,Nov. 35,1710. 
(3) Ibid,IV,570-3. R.Monckton to Harley,Aug.31,1710. 
(3) 11 God only knows what destruction our now ministry is pro-
paring for us",wrote Lord Townshond to General Stanhope on 
August 26,1710. Coxe's Waipole 11,34. 
10. 
This subtle dread of a mysterious 'somewhat1 which 
might over night lay prostrate the power of England,her 
wealthier industry, the liberties of her subjects and the 
freedom of her Church, was not a mere passing phenomenon* 
Vigorously though the new governpent pursued the war,wisely 
though the Tory Parliament granted supplies in abundance and 
undertook provision for past debts, in spite of repeated 
protestations of its loyalty to the Queen,the Protestant 
Succession and the Union, •Jacobiphobia1 remained a powerful 
influence in political thinking.(1) Not till the death of 
the Queen and the peaceful transfer of government to the 
Hanoverian house,was public sentiment convinced that the 
Queen and all her advisers did not intend a Stuart Restora-
tion*^ ) 
(1) Cf. letters from Defoe to Oxford, writ ten from Scotland 
in 1713. Port.MSS.V,334 229-30,335* See also Hist.Comm. 
Report VII (Egmont MSS.j p.338. 
(3) As the pretender was wholly unprepared to make an invasion 
of ^ngland when this event occurred, the theory that Boling-
broke and his coterie overthrew Oxford to make way for the 
accession of James lacks weight, contemporary statements 
gathered in the Macpherson Papers,Vol.II,pp.530 and 533 
declare explicitly that the removal of Oxford was supported 
by the Hanoverian Tories. John Drumraond was ready to go to 
Hanover as emissary of the new administration when Anne's 
death brought about a reorganization of the government* 
Intrigues had undoubtedly been carried on with the Stuarts 
by both Oxford and Bolingbroke.(See Stuart MSS.I,passim) 
But this appears to have had no further motive than the secure 
ing of Jacobite support for their administration« 
11. 
the same time that Harley was hampered by this 
suspicion of Jacobite leanings,his position in the party 
of which he was the nominal head was decidedly uncertain. 
The extreme section of the Tory party, whose warmth caused 
so much embarrassment, were not slow to give him warning 
as to the regard in which he was held by them. To the 
fhighflyersf, Harley was hut a 'necessary ladder1, (1) for 
it was only through his influence at court that the church 
party could regain power. Bat it was felt by thoroughgoing 
party men that with the party once more in the saddle,his 
continued leadership would be a handicap to the Tory inter-
ests. His past political antecedents branded him as a 
'trickster1. He might with cause have protested himself as 
staunch a whig as a Tory. Many were the Tories whose roeord 
of service and title to recognition seemed higher; and the 
Earl of Rochester,shortly to become President of the council, 
was a logical rival claimant for party leadership. To 
counterbalance this expected defection formed an incentive 
to Harley to overlook party lines in distributing government 
(1) See Port.MSS.IV,570-2; 573-5. Letters written to Harley 
ia J»lpot,1710, by Robert Monckton who had gone to the 
central part of -pngland as a political scout for his patron* 
37«/ 
positions. Shortly after his return to office he issued 
a declaration that a coalition government was hoped forj 
(1) and he began intriguing valiantly with the several 
Wfiig great officers of state to secure their adhesion to the 
new order of things.(2) 
Throughout his ministry Harley endeavoured consist-
ently to pursue the policy thus announced. The Tories who 
flocked to London demanding a 1 division of the spoils' were 
tactfully but decisively put off with scant assurances. 
Instead of a general overhauling of the departments in party 
interest,Harley strove earnestly to keep in office such 
able whigs as Robert Walpole. Lord Halifax and the Dukes of 
Somerset and Newcastle remained in responsible positions. 
Likewise in parliamentary practice,both in the commons tut 
more especially as Lord Oxford, Harley was very tnmindful of 
(1) "All those of the Whig party who shall abandon the ill 
designs of the junto and heartily concur (according to their 
own principles) in the promotion of the publio good, will 
be as freely admitted to employments,as well regarded as 
ever; nothing being more desired than a coalition of the 
hbnestest men of both sides to balance the overgrown power 
of the ministers and to manage the affairs of the government 
in such ways as may most conduce to the ease of her majesty 
and the welfare and prosperity of the nation.* Faults on 
_JlQ.tii BiJLejL 9 by 'Richard Harley*. Ascribed to Robert Harley 
at the time,tut probably written by Dffoe under his patron's 
direction. In somers Tracts,XII,696. 
(2) The story of this intrigue is at large in the Portland 
MSB., Vols.II and IV. 
13. 
of party lines. He was virtually outside the party organ-
ization in the Commons,maintaining to the end a close 
correspondence with Lord Halifax and following his advice 
in many of his olitical convolutions{l)Harley sought 
constantly to build up shifting party groups which would 
support his measures, and often shaped his own beliefs to 
harmonize with the majority. He claimed to be seeking to 
maintain a party of fthe Queen's servants1, who would 
uphold the honour and dignity of the Crown irrespective of 
party designations. In this he was no doubt perfectly 
sincere, while success would mean his own political 
fortune,he thought that such a policy was for the best 
interests of the country as well. 
But Harley!s policy of seeking support from both 
parties was not destined to go unchallenged.Opposition 
assumed organized form through the October Club which was 
the hot-bed of parliamentary Tory intrigue for a considerable 
part of his administration. This club had been in existence 
(1) For random examples see Portland M3S. V, 370-1,292, 
and 451. Letters from Halifax to Oxford in 1713 and 1714. 
The last is dated May 39,1714. 
14. 
sinoe the time of William I I I , but now became of special 
significance because of the large number of high Tories 
who had newly become members of Parliament. Estimates of 
its membership range from one hundred to one hundred and 
sixty. / I I were in the House of commons and acted more or 
less as a unit in regard to political questions, while 
the club seems to have made no organize attempt to hamper 
Harleyfs •pecific projects, it worked constantly against 
the spirit of his ministry by its intemperate denunictaion 
of his predecessors.(1) 
These country members, "who had no merit butby 
embroiling things"(3) were insistent on having thorough 
investigation made of alleged faults of the late ministers.(3) 
committees of investigation were almost as numerous as in a 
Democratic House of Representatives. Resolutions denouncing 
the whig ministers and corruption of their departments 
flooded the calendar. One of the first acts of Parliament 
was to make the commons more secure in the Tory hands by 
imposing high qualifications for membership. (4) The Occasional 
(1) Swift:Journal to gtella,Feb.18,1711. Swift corresp.I, 
335-7. swift to Peterborough,Feb.19,1711. 
(2) Swift Corresp.I,333-4.Xfcp.King to Swift,Dec.16,1710* 
( 3 ) Journal to Stella.Jan.7,1711. 
(4) 9 jknne,c.f. 
15. 
Conformity bill which passed at the following session 
was pressed largely for the purpose of gaining party 
strength in the boroughs where the dissenting Whigs were 
strongest. 
The Earl of Robfeftfctter, Willi am Bromley and Sir 
Thomas Hamner appear successively as presidents of the 
October club* But they were not its typical representatives. 
Composedprincipally of young men,and being essentially the 
majority organization in the house of C°rhmons,it pointed 
the way to political pj^dgress in a period of constitutional 
reaction.(1) 
Toward the close of the Oxford ministry, the 
circumstances of the peace gave rise to many factional 
divisions.1 Hanoverian and Jacobite Tories, ^rench and jputch 
Tories, for and again*t the peace1(3) became designations 
of different groups. From the old October rjlub, itself torn 
by dissension, emerged groups which sometimes carried votes 
% 
against the ministry, of which the most important was the 
(1) -'Reaction1 is here used of course in the relative sense. 
Political progress in Sixg&and in the past two centuries has 
been in the direction of parliamentary control of the 
government. The Oxford ministry stands asa protest against 
this in the day when the movement was taking shape. 
(3) Dartmouth MSS.,319. E.Lewis to Lord Dartmouth,Oct. 1,1713. 
16. 
rejection of the eighth and ninth articles of the treaty 
of commerce with France. This crisis was carried off by 
a dissolution; a smiliar one was met by the creation of 
new peers.(1) By these expedients the ministry was able 
to carry on affairs of state unimpeded by a parliament 
that was beooming increasingly unmanageable. Bat constant 
opposition to Harley from his party which had failed to 
profit by its success, led to hie final overthrow. A 
week before the death of the Queen, he surrendered, the 
white Staff; but the accession King (-.eorge brought to 
an end the plans of Bolingbroke for a policy of "Thorough". (3) 
The administration during which the south Sea 
Company took definite shape, thus presents a veritable 
mosaic of surface and underlying political forces. The period 
is one preeminently of transit! on: from the Stuart to the 
Hanoverian dynasty; from ministerial to the parliamentary 
form of government; from a period of wasteful continental 
(1) On January 1,1711/2, twelve new Tory peers were created 
after several resolutions of censure against the goteerament 
had been pushed through by the Nottingham bolters. 
(2) The part which the*Assiento contract' for the South 
Sea trade played in the differences between Oxford and 
Bolingbroke will appear later.page 118. 
17. 
warfare to a period of peaceful conquest through a bcoad 
policy of commercial expansion, I n such an era permanent 
party alignment of stable governmental methods were 
impossible. Jacobite and Octobrist, Hanoverian Tory and 
Whig Republican now wrestle in an ever-shifting political 
arena* Behind the scenes in the clrQset of the Queen,gather 
by the back stair Lady Masham, Viscount Bolingbroke, the 
Duchess of somerset, x,ord Oxford and Arthur Moore, to play 
the game on which will hang the destinies of Europe for a 
generation. 
Chapter Two, 
A TROUBLESOME LEGACY. 
• n* tt* ii* n* tr* n* tt* tt* 
» 
With this brief survey of the factional divisions 
which formedthe background of the activity of the Tory 
ministry it will be proper to turn to an examination of 
thw financial problems which confronted the new Treasury 
Lords. The financing of the war and the re-establishing 
of public credit were the great tasks which called for all 
of Harley*s zeal and industry froiri the first. 
It was largely circumstantial that this problem of 
public finance loomed up more prominently in the first year 
of parley's ministry than it did under Godolphin. The 
government was certainly not now weaker in this regard than 
it had been for two years past. Complaints of non-payment 
of petty claims had been fully as frequent. The difficulty 
of finding funds to support war loans had been apparently as 
great, t^© Bank had refused to lend 100,000 pounds on very 
good security. (1) The mass of unsecured bills on the navyJ 
victualling and ordnance offices had already reached its 
(1) Parliamentary History VII Appendix,xci-xcv. A Brief 
Account of the Ministry of Robert Harley,Earl of Oxford. 
19. 
height at •even million pounds. Because of the want of 
security and growing distrust, both these bills and 
ordinary government tallies on the mortgaged customs duties 
had begun to pass at a discount. (1) Government remitters 
complained that they could not dispose of tallies and 
urged money payments. (2) The issuance of 1,900,000 pounds 
in Exchequer bills in 1709 relieved the situation some-
what; but as no provision for interest was made until 1714, 
these too were soon passing at a discount* The constantly 
(1) "The artificers are nearly two years behind in their 
payment and their debentures carry no interest; some had 
been sold at 30% discount." Commissioners of ortoance to 
Marlborough,Han.14,1709/10. Cal.Treas.CXX,6* 
wThe Governor and Director* of the Bank were resolved not 
to meddle with these tallies and no private person would 
purchase without either discount or interest.* John Lans-
dell,T^6a«urer of Ordnance to William Lowndes,May 29,1709* 
Cal.Treas.CXIV,26. 
The Court of Directors of the East I^dia Company informed 
the Lord Treasurer that they could not accept his proposal to 
pay for the petre for the board of ordnance with tallies on 
the general mortgage to commence in 1714, as 45,000 pounds 
on the last order had not been paid. They wanted money pay-
ment or FXchequer bills. Dec.23,1709.Cal.T^eas.CXVII,46. 
As early as June 8,1708,the Commissioners of Ordnance had 
complaitt*d that they could not dispose of tellies on the 
lamd tax and on the liquor tax. Cal.Treas.CVII,39. 
(2) Sir HWiry Furnese,who was Godolphin1s principal financial 
a ent,complained on April 15,1709 that he had had nothing but 
tallies of late "which could not be disposed of".Cal.Treas. 
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increasing; expenses of the war and the restlessness of the 
country at a policy which was draining the nation of its 
money at the rate of six millions a year, made the problem 
of taxation and funding a vital one.(l) 
go apparent was the necessitous condition of the 
government that Godolphin was flooded with ready-made plans 
for raising money and for the reform of the financial 
©ystem(2)A letter written at this time by ^illiam paterson, 
the founder of the Bank of England, strikes at the root of 
the difficulties. Paterson insisted that "a true state of 
the public revenues and debts be laid before the House* to 
(1) Regret was expressed that paterson failed of election 
to Parliament in 1708, as it deprived the Commons of the 
services of "so able a projector at this pinch for money"• 
Port.MSS. ,17 ,511. pec.3,1708. 
(2) A partial list of these proposals will indicate the 
wide variety of schemes of which the fertility of -gritish 
genius was capable; 
Oct.26,1708. To raise revenue by duties for firs assurance, 
hP arth money and a lottery Cal.T^eas.CIX,44. 
Nov.7,1709. Tax on "superfluities and vanities*.Cal.Treas. 
CXVI,43. 
Nov.10,1709.Tax on gold and silver plate and bachelors. 
Ibid,48. 
Dec.10,1709.Tax on candles. Ibid CXVII,22* 
Dec.17,1709.Tax on hats and stockings,proposed by "B.S.* 
Ibid,28. 
Dec.24,1709.Lottery fund of 135,000 pounds.Ibid,50. 
Liquor license tax.Ibid,CXIX,10. 
. . . . . . ...Proposal to render interest on navy bills easy. 
Ibid,12. 
To raise one million by a tax on hfais».Ibid,26. 
Jan.|8,1710.Duties on soap,journeyman tailors,wigs,shoes, 
firbulos1,scarfs and 134.in the pDund on ministers.Ibid,CXX,9 
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the end that it be prevailed on: (I) to make provisions of 
interest for all such debts; (II) to grant supplies to seoir e 
the nation from further deficiencies; (III) to provide that 
the public payments be as regular and certain as in Venice 
or Holland. He recommended an inquiry into the Admiralty 
and Victualling departments as well as a thorough investigation 
of the methods of collecting revenue. (1) The critique 
seems to have had no effect, and Paterson declared later 
that the annuities and lotteries which Godolphin did resort 
to at this time to raise money only mads bad matters worse. (3) 
With the monied men of London his personal friends,depending 
more than anything else on his own unquestioned integrity 
for redemption' and continuing to back him because already 
(1) Proceedings of the Wednesday Club in Friday Street. 1716. 
In paterson1 s worFs,II,74-80, quoting the letter from 
Paterson to Godolphin,written December 13,1709. Paterson 
sums up the state of affairs in 1709 as follows: "We see 
the then large debt of 15 or 16 millions doubled; the public 
revenues almost wholly sold and alienated and yet about one-
third of new debts still without funds forpaying them; Bavy 
Bills and other such deficient credits at 30 or 35$? discount 
and in danger of falling still lower; with all of the other 
parts of the public credit in proportion our own industry 
and improvements under insurmountable difficulties; most 
of the branches of our foreign trade so or er-charged as to 
amount to a prohibition." 
(3) Ibid. Paterson1 s works, 11,81 ff . 
involved,Godolphin was able to make shift without any 
radical change of financial policy. However during the 
closing months of his tenure of office, pressure for a 
readjustment of affairs was becoming more insistent, 
contractors complained that the fall of government 
securities was compelling them to carry (pat their under-
takings at a genuine loss, and Marlborough himself wrote 
home, rather sharply demanding*wimmediate relief11 for the 
foreign contingents.(1) 
So Robert Harley found his financial problem 
ready made for him when he took office. Added to the 
difficulty of the situation as Godolphin had met it was 
the disordered condition which his sudden removal had left 
in the treasury. At the same time the influences in the ci 
which had tided Godolphin over the crisis,not only ceased 
to support, tut were beginning actively to oppose the credit 
of the government.Friends and foes alike therefore watched 
doubtfully as Harley undertook the task of restoring public 
credit.(2) 
(1) Marlborough Dispatches, V, 69-70.Marlborough to Lord 
Treasurer>juiy 14,1710. 
(2) ,fHow you will restore credit and find money for the 
demands which will be made upon you exceeds my capacity11.• 
IV O t 560° r d H a l i f a * " t c Harley on ^ugust 12,1710* Port.MSS, 
23* 
The most serious problem which Harley faced was 
the enormous discount which rested on almost six millions 
of public bills. These bills, ma inly on the Navy and 
Victualling offices, had been issued to cover deficiencies 
in appropriations and unusual expenditures for several 
years, but were absolutely unsecured. Most of them had 
not even been acknowledged by parliament as an obligation 
on the government. Interest on them had been paid in bills 
of the same questionablesecurity. a sympathetic effect on 
all branches of public finance was inevitable. The most 
direct resa It of the situation was,however, in the cost of 
government supplies. (1) with navy bills at 4o to 50$ 
discount, the supplies of the department cost exactly twice 
the normal price. Once encumbered with so injurious a'1 
debt, the deficiencies of the government were bound to grow 
by leaps and bounds; and in fact the debt already approximated 
the annual budget. 
While realizing the handicap which the existence of 
these debts placed upon the government,the Tories were not 
(1) The debt for the subsistence of prisoners had increased 
to such a height in November,1710 that it was feared the 
marshals would be thrown in prison for debt. "The tradesmen 
neither can nor will give any more c r e d i t . . . ^ forced to 
pawn goods. . . the prisoners must either be released or allowed 
to starve",wrote the marshal at Plymouth. Oal. freas. CXXV,34. 
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slow to turn the circumstance to their own advantage. It 
was quickly pointed out that these debts, to which the 
low credit of the government was largely due, had not been 
net by the Godolphin ministry, jt was urged that expenditures 
without warrant of parliament had brought the situation to 
pass. It was hinted that many of the expenditures so made 
would not stand the light of impartial investigation. Only 
the grossest extravagance and mismanagement could have caused 
so large a debt to remain so long unprovided for. 
It is difficult not to feel much sympathy with 
these contentions. But, as often happens with bodies of 
untrained legislators with a passion for refoxm, enthusiasm 
betfayed the Tory judgment. In their charges of mismanage-
ment against the Godolphin ministry the commons quite over-
shot their mark. The blame for the situation cannot fall 
wholly on Godolphin, although he allowed the government to 
drift into a position where complete loss of confidence 
seemed inevitable* A glance at the origin of the debts 
will demonstrate this proposition. 
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The chief items of the unsecured debt on 
Michaelmas,1710,from which date the public accounts were 
made up forpcesentation to the House of Commons, may be 
listed as follow*: (1) 
1. s. d. 
Naval and Victualling Bills .5,130,539. 5. 5 
Ordnance for land service 154,324. 15. 
Transport service. 424,791, 5. 
Army and transport debentures.... 1,018,656. 17. 
Deficient tallies and orders on 
loans of 8 Will. Ill and 1 Anne 12,025. 1. 0 
% 
Total .6,740,337. W. 
Of these unsecured debts,over one-third had been standing 
against the government from King William's reign. The 
principal of the army and transport debentures,for instance, 
had originated at the close of the last French war. It had 
amounted at firit to more than two million pounds. To the 
payment of these debentures King william
fs government had 
pledged the forfeited lands of prominent Irish rebels which 
were not otherwise granted to -royal favourites. In the 
course of several years these lands had all been disposed of 
(1) Comm.Journal XVI,541-2. These figures are taken from 
the list of debts for which grants were promised by the 
Commons on March 10,1711. Earlier reports placed the naval 
bills at 5,563,807 l . , 2 s . , 0 d.(ibid,415)$ transport bills at 
485,024 1 . , 3s . , 11 3/4 d.(ibid,429-30); and army and trans-
port debentures at 987,159 1. ,3». ,8d. (ibid,435). The debts 
acknowledged seem a more reliable guide* 
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and many of the debenture* paid off. Funds were on fcand 
against many others, the balance toward which no security 
was available amounting to the sum listed above. The 
state of this account as well as the nature of the claims 
against which the debentures were originally issued, appears 
from a statement presented to the House of Commons on 
fiecember 14,171Q? (1) 
1. s. d. 
DR. To Pay and Clothing 1,137,715. 17. 4 
To Chelsea Hospital 32,425. 3. 7. 
Irish Transport Service 298,286. 15. 5 
Minor items 150.801. 17 . 0 
Principal Outstanding 1,599,228. 13. 4. 
CR. By Purchase of Irish lands... . 612.071. 9. 8. 
Net principal Unsecured. .71 987,159. T. §7 
Interest on this sum amounting to 31,499 l.,l4s.,7ij-d. had 
accumulated since 1703 in arrears, and is chargeable against 
the Godolphin administration. The proprietors of this 
branch of the outstanding debt,posing as officers and offio«r(» 
widows were insistent in their demands for recognition.On 
January 8,1711 they petitioned the commons that three year*s 
6 
(1) Comm. Journ.XVI,435. 
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interest was due, and provision had been made for but 
one year of this. As a result they represented that their 
debentures stood at 40$ discount.(1) 
But the other branches of the current service had 
been suffering equally from the discount prevailing, and 
it must be admitted thiit debts in these department had 
arisen largely during Godolphin1s term of offiot* A ffiendly 
pamphleteer presents the following analysis of the origin 
of the unsecured debts£ (2) 
Debts arising Prior to the accession of Anne. 
•' . , ... / 1 8 d 
On Naval offices. .1,722,679. 5. 8. 
On Ordnance office... . 166,293. 9. 0 3/4 
A & T Debentures . 987,157. 3. 8. 
Arrears of subsidies due 
Hanover 9,375. 0. 0. 
Deficient tallies on coals 
and other duties... 12.025. 1. 0. 
3,897,529. 19. 4 3/4 
Debts Ari®in£ During Godolphin Ministry. 
On Naval offices 3,407,859. 19. 19 
On Transport service 424,791. 5. 4r( 
Interest on A & T Debentures 31.499. 14. 7-
3, 864,150. 2 
(1) Comm. Journ. XVI, 449-50. 
(2) Somers Tracts,XIII,335-6. The figures of this table vary 
only in a few minor details from official results. 
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Even this apparently formidable charge of a four 
million dollar deficiency against Godolphin could be ex-
plained in part by Robert Walpole.(l) On the basis of 
previous military experience, the establishment of the 
navy had been fixed from year to year at 40,000 men and the 
charge for wages,victualling and miscellaneous items con-
nected with the maintainence of the navy had been computed 
at four pounds per man per month. The demands of the long-
continued war,winter campaigns in the Mediterranean and nec-
essity for keeping a superior navy off the coast of Spain, 
had caused these estimates to be regularly exceeded. Nearly 
43,000 men were under employment and 1 wear and tear 1 was 
inadequately covered by the usual grants. Here plainly 
was ground for criticism of parliament. 
But had the sum of 2,200,000 pounds granted annually 
to the navy on the old calculations actually been made 
available for its use,much of the debt it fell into would 
have been av&idsd. Yet during the first nine years of Queen 
Annefs reign the real deficiency between the sums appropriate 
(1) Somers Tracts,XIII,3&g*|P< a Letter to a Friend con-
cerning the Public pebt,particularly that of the Navy.1711. 
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and finally raised amounted to 1,869,181 And of this 
sum, 1,411,001,1.,9s.,9-|d. was borne by the navy. As 
Walpole points out in his defense of the whig ministry,this 
arrangement was the only practicable one* The army which 
bought its own supplies must be paid in cash;subsidies and 
wages of foreign troops could not be delayed when united 
action was wanted; bills of exchange could not be disappoint-
ed. The seamen alone, for whom victuals were provided aboard 
ship, could bear to wait for their subsistence. And this 
branch,too,was the least likely to affect the general public 
credit. For years its bills circulated on a six per cent 
basis at par. "From the beginning of this war to November, 17C% 
the time when that infamous sermon was preached in St.Paul's(4) 
you will find that the discount upon navy* bills was never so 
high by 10^ as it is now,when we are told that the credit is 
restored and that effectual provision is made for the paying 
of the debts of the nation.*(3) 
For the balance of the Godolphin deficiency,Walpole 
rendered an itemized account of extraordinary expenditures 
(1) Referring to the sermon of Sacheverell on which his 
prosecution was based. 
(2) A Letter to a Ftiend. 1711. Somers Tracts,XIII, 320 
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for which Parliament simply failed to provide. The state-
ment shows the purposes for which practically two millions 
of bills were issued.(1) 2 
1 s d 
Interest on navy bills, , 242,365. 13. 0 
Interest on victualling bills..,209,939. 12. 6. 
Naval stores from America, 
per 3 & 4 Anne 18,000. 11. 6. 
Bounty money for French prisoners34,155. 0 0 
To raising money,4&5 Anne 4,729. 10. 5. 
Rebuilding ships lost in the 
Great Storm . 134,232. 0. 0. 
Bounty to widowa of seamen 
lost in Great Storm..,, 15,158. 0. 11. 
Bounty to officers serving under 
Sir George Rooke 30,777. 13. 5. 
To ordinary of navy,1704, . , , , , . 120,000. 0. 0. 
Account extfaordinary expense 
9 years @ 14,000 1 126,000. 0. 0. 
To commissioners of Transports, 
1703-4 83,575. 12. 8. 
Extra expense account marines.. 119,675. 8. 3. 
To Affies sick and wounded.,,,. 100,2 8, 14, 6, 
To hire ships to carry victuals 145,598. 17. 3^ 
To victualling land forces 
in Spain and portugal.. 606,806. 7. 7. 
From this showing it would appear that the most 
inefficient factor in the conduct of finances under 
Godolphin had been the House of Commons. Clearly the 
majority of expenses for which bills were issued were 
( ! ) A Letter to a friend c^nc^erning the Public Debt*, 
particularly that of the Navy/ 1711/'Yn Soraers Tracts, 
XI11,307-17, p~, 315. 
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such as should have been definitely provided for by 
Parliament. Many indeed had been directed by a definite 
address or act of the Lords and Commons. But wherever 
the blame was to rest for incurring these deficient debts, 
the public service; was bound to suffer severely from 
their continuance. There was no problem calling for 
immediate solution for which the ministry could render 
full satisfaction without clearing the nation's record 
in this regard. The honor of the government and its 
prestige abroad?, as well as the stability of the new 
ministry demanded that full provision be made for the 
unsecured debts. 
Chapter Three. 
FRAMING THE SOUTH SEA PROJECT. 
* 11* If* II* II* ft* 
The old whig parliament had been dissolved on 
September 21,1710. The elections which followed gave the 
most overwhelming victory for the Tories in many years. 
Public opinion was enthusiastic in its support of the 
change in ministry. Over one hundred and fifty new Tory 
members were returned to the House of C°mmons. Even the 
City of London, supposed to be safe in the control of the 
great whig merchants, defeated Sir Gilbert Heathoots,the 
governor of the Bank, and ele<dgfc#d four Tory burgesses. 
To Harley as leader of the Commons had fallen the 
task of fornulating the program for the new parliament, 
with the three necessary Tory policies in mind,he had set 
diligently to work to plan legislation which would carry 
them into effect. The purpose of the government as he 
announced it through the Queen was: (I) to grant supplies 
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with unanimity and dispatch to carry on the war with the 
utmost vigor,particularly in Spain; (II) to find some way 
to answer the demands of the navy and other offices and to 
prevent the accumulation of like debts for the future, 
with a view to "establishing and preserving the national 
creditJi and (ill) to bring to an honorable end ths 
sufferings caused by the long and ejcpensivs war.(l) These 
policies deemed to depend upon each other in exact order. 
If funds could not be found for the running expenses of the 
government, it would be hopeless to seek provision for its 
past debts. If the resources of the land w ĵre insufficient 
either to carry on the war or to give security of pedemption 
of outstanding bills, hopes Ifipr an honorable peace would 
be exceedingly %Lint. To many men,all seemed alike 
impossible; even so brilliant a financier as Lord Halifax 
could not see how Harley could find money for all the 
demands that would be made upon him. 
Harley*s difficulties were increased by the fact 
that taxation,always a tender matter with men of Anglo-
(1) Address of the Queen,Nov.37^1710. Lor<*s aourn*XIX,166. 
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Saxon strain,was now a more delicate matter than usual* 
Scarcely had England ended the century-long struggle OTibsr 
the right of parliament to grant all the revenue used by the 
king,when:. >«he entered upon a long and expensive continental 
war, during which the utmost ingenuity of statesmen was 
called forth in the endeavor to secure the necessary 
supplies. The experience of past governments as described 
by D«foe may serve to indicdire the problem which confronted 
the new administration; (1) 
wifhen upon the Revolution the parliament fell most 
willingly into the war, as a thing of the enemy by 
espousing King James1s interest made absolutely 
necessary, the first branch of our expence was aarried 
on in the common road of levying taxes, and the money 
required for every year's expence was raised and paid 
fcithin the year. 
"The nation was rich,trade prodigiously great,paper-
credit run high, and the goldsmiths in Lombard street 
commanded immense sums; anticipations were indeed in 
practice,they had been so of old, and borrowing clauses 
were added to the bills of aid, but these lasted but 
a few months, the money came in of course, and they were 
paid off in their turn. Land-tax,polls,additional 
duties of customs,excises and the like, were the ways 
and means by which these things were done; the year 
generally supported its own demands; all the loans were 
supposed to be temporary, and to end with the collection. 
wAs the war every year grew heavier upon us, and 
the expence increased,new ways and means were necessary 
to supply the growing demand,till all the taxes that 
(1) An Essay Upon Loans: 3y the author of the Essay on 
CredTT. 1710. Somers Tracts,XIII,36-7. 
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could be raised by the ordinary way were found little 
enough to bring the annual expence about. 
"This put the commissioners of the treasury upon 
listening to new taxes, and entertaining all the pro-
jects for raising money that the working heads of the 
age could supply them with. These,backed with 
parliamentary authority,were too unadvisedly supposed 
to raise such certain sums hs the publick occasions 
then called for, and borrowing claasss were added to 
them, limiting the said sums; which passed as a giving 
the treasury credit upon the acts of parliament for 
such sums as they were granted for; but the collections 
falling entirely short of the sums proposed,left 
the publick in arrear to the lenders, and from henoe 
oa*Hithe great load of deficiencies which the nation 
feels the weight of to this hour. 
*As the sums given fell short,so the war called 
every year for still greater sums; which,added to the 
deficiencies of the old taxes.grew so heavj that 
our managers found it was in vain to struggle with 
the difficulty any longer upon the foot of the annual 
taxss; and that it was next to impossible to raise 
every year what the public occasions called for. 
nThis led them to a new method to supply the 
great demands of the war,viz.- by establishing annual 
receipts of limited or jwrpstual interests for such 
sums as might be borrowed upon the credit of the natiox^ 
the principal to sink in the hands of the public. 
These were called funds. To encourage the people to 
lend upon these funds, premiums for advancing the 
money,large interests and othsr advantages were annexed; 
such as, 14$ upon annuities with survivorship,chances 
of prizes by way of lottery,7$ upon exchequer bills and 
the lika.* 
Just before Harley1 s return to power,the situation 
of the governmut in fiscal matters had grown rapidly 
worse. In 1707 the practice of mortgaging the customs 
duties in advance in return for loans was begun, ^ithin 
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three years the customs were mortgaged until 1730 for 
money supposed to have been advanced the government,on 
which the payments of interest in the meantime were very 
uncertain. But with the government tallies at a dis^ 
count and a large share of the 1710 mortgage unsubscribed, 
it seemed that this plan was not only wasteful tut 
positively worthless. In addition the government was 
running behind on its expenses nearly a million pjnjnds 
a year,making up sums unprovided for which were simply 
added to the mass of unsecured bills outstanding, curing 
the past year the tot&l receipts at the Exchequer,including 
funds actually col3s oted and those supplied by striking 
tallies, had amounted to 6,431,350 l . 16s. ,6^d. For the 
coming year the estimates showed Harley that over seven 
millions would be required* No complete budget of #sti»» 
ates was made up, but from scattered reports in the 
COfcmons Journal a statement may be made up which presents 
concioly the financial problems of the year. The 
exchequer receipts for 1710 and the appropriations made 
for the year 1711 will form an adequate basis for such 
a statement. 
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Receipts on parliamentary Grants.1710. 
By oash paid in by way of loan, payment a of taxes **c«— 
1. s d 
Land Tax 1,339,120. 9 . 10. 
Candle and Apprentice t a x . . . . . . 87,886. 8. 10. 
Sixth General Mortgage 151,050. 0 0 
Malttax (deducting deficiency) 1,930. 0 0 
Lottery . .1 ,419,568. 5. 6. 
Annuities for 33 years. 899.975. 0 . 1. 
3,889,530. £ 57 
Supplied by striking tallies for use of paymasters..... 
550,879. 10. 3. 
413,113. 11. 3 . , 
1,145,503. 9. 11 3/4 
433.334. 10. lift -
3,531,830. 8l 3? 
3.889.530. 4. 3. 
6,431,350. 6. 
Appropriations for service of 1711. 
1 s d 
For 40,000 men for sea service.. 3,080,000. 0. 0 . 
Ordinary of navy 130,000. 0. 0. 
For 40,000 land troops 919,093. 3. 6. 
Additional levy of 10,000 177,511. 3. 6. 
3,000 Palatines 34,351. 13. 4. 
4,639 Saxons 43,351. 13. 6. 
800 men of Bothmar,s dragoons... 9,369. 16. 6. 
Troops of augmentation 330,000. 0 . 0. 
Guards and garrisons for Great Br. 546,108. 17. 8 3/4 
Office of ordnance fur land troops 130,000. 0 . 0 . -
Transport of troops to Flanders... 144,000. 0. 0. 
Remittances to Flanders.... . . 100,000. 0. 0. 
Subsidies to allies 478,956. 16. 7. 
Far war in Spain and Portugal.... 1,5009000. Q. 0 . 
To Bank to redeem Exchequer bills 156,657. 13. 8. 
Extraordinary charges of the war. 393,369. 3. 4. 
Interest on loans on land tax 
for 1706-8 136,885. 9. 9^ 
On Land T a x . . . . . . . . 
On Candle etc. tax. 
On General Mortgage 
On jjalt Tax 
Grand Total Receipts 
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Appropriations tot service of 1711, con. 
1. . . s d 
To carry 6,845,468. 19. 5£ 
Interest on loans on malt duties. 330,898. 10. 4. 
Interest on Million Lottery... 45,845. 9. 3. 
Interest on Two Million Adventure 34,741. 9. 5* 
Commissioners on accounts 6.000. 0. 0» 
Total Appropriations... 7,399,839. 17. 4£ 
Here was to be bridged a prospective g$p of 900,000 
pounds between past receipts and probable expenditures. 
And Harley bad promised himsel-f that there would be no 
anticipation of customs or excise taxes, on which 
Godolphin had settled a million pounds in tallies. 
It will not be necessary to follow through in 
detail the methods resorted to 'to make ends meet1. 
Various new excise taxes were devised on which large 
lottery funds were established. In this way assurance 
was given that the receipts would at least equal those 
of the preceding year.(l) yor our purpose it will be 
sufficient to call attention to the fact that the plans 
for the aew taxes,together with the project adopted for 
(1) a® will be seen shortly, 500,000 1. for the service 
of the current year were included in the capital of the 
iouth Sea Company. The remaining problems of making 
the parliamentary grants *go around* seem to have been 
solved by the usual expedient of not pushing the war in 
the Peniasula* 
45* 
oaring for the outstanding debts, had all been arranged 
by H&rl®y before parliament met,November 31,1710,(1) 
details in every case were to be attended to, but the 
essential features of the South Sea project, as of the 
other fiscal measures, had already been settled upon in 
Harley's own mind. To avoid speculation in the depreciated 
tallies, the plan for providing security for them was 
kept secret by himself and two other men. One of these 
must have been ^dward Harley,the Auditor of the Exchequer£ 
it would be futile to venture a guess as to the identity 
of the other.(3) 
Question has been raised in recent years as to 
the origin of the south sea scheme. The traditional 
character-sketch of the e ^ 1 o f Oxford has represented 
him as being incapable of initiating anything original,Aiid 
as lacking the driving will to put ifcything into execution. 
Accordingly it has pleased investigators to delve for evideno« 
to support a theory that this or that publicist of the 
Eighteenth century suggested the plan to Harley.(3) 
(1) Pari.Hist.VII,Appendix,xci. Harley*s letter to the 
?ueen at the close of hits ministry, 
3) Probably a confidential clerk. Port.MSS.V,464,in the 
f\\al 2 f a
L 2 r d 0 x f o r d ' 8 letter to the Queen. 13; Notably E.S.Rosooe in Robert Harley,Earl of Oxford 
39. 
If the major premise lacks in convincing quality,the 
irvidenoe so far deduced to support the claims of any other 
man than Lord Oxford to the authorship of the bill toes 
even more so* certainly no one who reads with an im-
partial eye the glowing tributes that are paid to 
H a r l e y ' s abilities by contemporaries who were not at all 
bound to do so, or who watches the warm friendship and 
admiration he inspired in such freelances as Halifax, 
Swift and for a long time in Bolingbroke, can doubt the 
possibility of his being responsible fo* the acts of his 
administration. Certainly with regard to the South 
Sea company,evidence to the contrary is wholly inadequate. 
The man most often given credit by imaginative 
investigators for authorship of the scheme has been Daniel 
Defoe. Letters brought to light in the report of the 
Historical Manuscripts Commission in the last fifteen 
yeare have been accepted as pointing to this conclusion. 
Certain it is true that D e f o e ' s usefulness to the 
eucceasive ministries in the reign of Queen Anne far 
exceeded the work for which he was early given credit. 
40# 
As a political spy, as incessant editor of news sheets, 
as pamphleteer and as promoter of various plans for the 
improvement of relations with Scotland, and of trada 
and commerce, DsJ<ptafs aid was invaluable. Bat however 
much the products of his refcless brain affected the policy 
of his patron in other regards,there seems to be no 
reason for believing that Defoe originated this very 
itop<$rtant feature of his program - the S^uth Sea Company* 
No contemporary statement has been found which denies 
that Harley was responsible for the project, whi£k Harley 
repeatedly refers to it in his correspondence as "my 
child11, and which to the end of his carser he himself and 
all his friends regarded as his "masterpiece"* 
Harley himself makes the declaration that before 
the opening of Parliament he had prepared a plan for fundiig 
nine millions of the outstanding debts. (1) As early as 
November he wrote to his correspondent John Drummond 
at Amsterdam that he was working on the project. "At this 
moment",he writes, "I am upon a proposition which will 
immediately restore all our credit. and this I hop© to 
effect before Parliament meets."(2) The correspondence 
— • ; „\ ' ' 
'.« u .-.y 
(1) Par1.Hiat.VII,Append.,xoi# 
(3) Port.MSS. IV, 633, 
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with Defoe at this time reveals no traoe whatever of 
intercourse with reference to financial projects, Defoe 
was on his way to gcotland on a political mission and for 
months before and after spent the greater part of his 
time at work shaping public opinion* Not until the 
summer of 1711, a full month after the south sea 
was passed, is there the slightest allusion on the part 
of Defoe to the plan. Then there is not trace of 
previous conversation on the subject*(1) If the company 
was organized at the instance of any one besides Harley 
himself, it does not appear to have been at Defoe's 
suggestion* 
Of course it would be futile to marshal evidence 
to disprove a possi ble negative. The air was full of 
South sea expeditions and fiscal schemes. William Paterson, 
Dr.Hugh Chamber 1 ayne, Davanant and Lord H alifax all 
conferred with Harley during the winter of 1710-1 on 
financial matters. have just found Harley himself stating 
that one other man besides himself and his brother knew of 
(1) Port.MSS*V,33* oe to Oxford,#une 36,1711* «I 
would gladly have spoken six wards with your LQrdship 
*n the subject of the south gea affair in which I persuade 
myself I may do some service in print.* Two weeks latar 
Defoa was given opportunity to present his visws, and ha 
outlined plans to found a colony in Peru* Ibid,V. 50-3. 
58-61,66-8. 
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the plan beftore it was laid before a party caucus, ^t 
is entirely conceivable that these clues might point 
to authorship in some other person than Harley* History 
must rest on sjanething more than possibilities,however, 
^nd in view of the facts baiefly outlined and the circum-
-sfe anoe that no contemporary claim is made on behalf of 
another projector than Harley, the conclusion seems 
justified that credit or blame for the institution must 
rsst with him* 
In what,than, did the plan for providing security 
for the outstanding bills and tallies,consist? Briefly 
stated, Harley proposed to fund these debts to form tha 
capital stock of a corporation, certain taxes ware set 
aside to secure the payment of interest on this capital, and 
the creditors were given the monopoly of British trade to 
the South seas,from the Orinoco up the wast coast of 
America, not to exceed 300 milss from shore. Let us 
•;•»' S'i 
consider the project as f jnally launched in moredetail*(1) 
The capital stock of the new corporation was 
fixed at 9,471,335 ppunds,Which may be listed under the 
(1) Statutes-at-Large,XII, 193-339 * 9 Anns,c.31. "An act 
for making good deficiencies, and satisfying the publio 
debts; and for erecting a corporation to carry on a trade 
to the south Seas * 
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following heads: (i) the item of 6,740,337 l . , 5s . , 3 3/4d. 
of unsecured debts for which we have already given 
account,and for whose benefit the act was primarily 
devised^ (ii) the deficiency in the navy,transport and 
victualling services frogi September 29 to December 25, 
1710, together with interest on the army and transport 
debentures for the same period* 378,859 l«,5s. ,8£d. ; 
( i i i ) interest from December 25,1710 to December 25,1711 
on the debentures, 85,000 (iv) tallies on the 
mortgage loan provided for in 8 Anne,c.13,which had been 
unsubscribed because the security for it had not 5a t 
taken p}a«ra, 1,296,582 1 . ,9s . ,11 3/4d. ; (v) interest on 
latter sum to March 35,1711, 74,875 i . , 19s . , Id* ; (vi) 
interest on all the above items from March 35,1711 to Dec-
amber 25,1711, 386,335 1 . ; (vii) a loan of 500,000 pounds 
for the current expenses of the government for theyaar* 
A table will make these items more clear*? 
Principal of unsecured bills and 1 a d 
tallies outstanding,Sept,39,1710..6,740,337. 5* 2 3 /4 
Additional bills and interest on 
army and transport debentures 
to Dec.25,1710 . 378,859. 5. 8£ 
Interest to December 35 , 1711 . . . . . . . 85,000. 0. 0* 
Mortgage loan of 1710 1,296,583. 9.11 3 /4 
Interest on same to Mar»35f 1711 . . . . 74>875. 19. 1. ^ 
8,585,000* 0. 0* 
Interest to Dec. 25,1711. 386,335* 
Loan for current e x p e n s e s * 5 0 0 * 0 0 0 * / 
Total capital . . . . . . 9,471,33^* " 
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Harley foresaw that it would he impossible for the 
govarnment to pay the 6 $ interest promised the first 
year and so had provided for subscribing this into 
the original capital* 
Three separate systems of taxes were set aside to 
secure the payment of interest in years to come.(i) The 
customs duties on wines,vinegar,tobacco,East india goods, 
wrought silks,whale-fins,etc*,which had been mortgaged from 
August 1,1716 for four years to secure thw payment of the 
loan to Godolphin in 1710, were now diverted and made 
permanent to secure the payment of inter est and principal 
of the s°uth Sea ftind* (1$ It was partly to secure the use 
of these duties that the mortgage tallies themselves had % 
been admitted into the stock of the company* (ii) To 
provide for the interest payments before 1716 was the 
difficult problem* The best provision that could be found 
was to set aside the proceeds of the duties on rock salt 
and %filt levied in 1 Anne,c*13, as far as thsy were not 
otherwise obligated for the payment of other funds* (2) 
They had been mortgaged 8 j^nne, c*13,sec*13 as security for 
(1) 9 Anne c.21,sees. 1-4. 
(2) Ibid,sees*5-6* 
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for a loan, and were available for only a small fraction 
6f the interest due. (iii) Certain duties on candles,wax 
and tallow, clerks,apprentices,etc.,granted 8 j&nne,c.9 
frorr May 1,1710 to May 1,1715 to secure a loan of 500,000 
pounds were continued forever. The proceeds after the 
payment of the original loan and interest which they 
secured were to be applied to the payment of the interest 
and principal of the South Sea oapital.(l) 
It must be evident that even Harley had not been 
able to offer very satisfactory security for the trouble-
some debts. Clearly the interest payments must be 
deficient for fiveoyeara, though promise of anple security 
tfter that time might mean something to a creditor* To 
provide for the deficiencies which were bound to occur, 
quarterly accounting was to be made and within twenty days 
after the fiscal quarter payment of the deficient 
interest was to be made by the treasurer of the navy out 
of such money or tallies as were in his hands and out of 
the first he might get thereafter. (2) A deficient 
stock was to be created,in other words, to maintain the 
parity of now deficient tallies which were in turn to be 
(1) 9 A^ne,c.21,secs.7-8. 
(2) Ibid,sec.16. 
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re-issued to pay the interest on the stock* This truly 
was a vicious circle of financial manipulation* Hope 
was held out,however, that the Commons might secure mora 
adequate provision under more prosperous conditions* 
Annual estimates of the probable deficiency based on a 
three-year average were to be presented to Parliament, and 
the naval treasurer was responsible only in case no action 
was taken in the matter* (1) 
The annual interest charge due from the government 
to the Compny was fixed in the statute at 568,269 l.^lOs** 
six per cent on the gross capital authorized. (2^ This 
sum was to be paid without increase or abatement until 
December 25,1713? by which time it was expected that the 
capital would be filled. Account was then to be made up 
of the paid in capital and any excess or deficient interest 
for the preceding years on this basis was to be made up 
in the 1714 payment. (3) An additional sum of 8,000 pounds 
mnnually was to be paid the Company for expenses of manager 
X 
ment of the fund on behalf of the public* (4) The fund of 
(1} 9 Anne,c.31,sec.17. 
(2) Ibid,sec.20. 
(3) Ibid,sec*34. It was then found that the capital was 
some 300,000 pounds short. Tally-holders on the general 




interest was to determine on one year's notice after 
December 25,1716 and on repayment of the entire principal 
of ttffe Company's stock.(1) A supplemental act passed 
tin the following year was required to specify that sudx 
would 
repayment^ not affect the status of the corporation 
but that its rights were vested in perpetuity. (2) 
Description in great detail of the bills and 
tallies which might be subscribed into the gouth sea 
capital is to be found in the act. into all of the 
ramifications of these ^tpvisos and exceptions it will 
not be worth while to enter. However it may bs stated 
in general that persons interested in bills belonging 
to the general classes which have already been described 
on March 25,1711 ( one month before the introduction of 
he bill) should be admitted to the company in a proportion 
to be fixed by Her Majesty. (3) ^ special article 
provided that tallies,bills and orders in the hands of 
government paymaster on May 1,1711 should be subscribed 
into the fund for the benefit of the public* (4) Amission 
(1) 9 j\nne,c.21,sec.24. 
(2) r * \ 10 Anne,c.30* 
(3) 9 Anne,c.21,sees.29-31* 
(4) Ibid,sec.28. 
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of these tallies was obligatory on the company to 
December 25,1711. ^fter that time the directors of the 
company might purchase or admit to the joint-stock as 
they saw fit unsubscribed tallies included within the 
specified classes.(1) 
The act provided that the Queen might issue 
articles of incorporation to the subscribers,creating 
them a body corporate and politic with perpetual succession 
under such name as she might see fit, with power to ohodtoe 
a governor and directors under such limitations as Her 
Majedb y might prescribe. (2) The conpany was to have 
power to purchase land in England of an annual value of 
not more than 1,000 pounds for office^purposes. It was 
not to borrow money on bills payable on demand or at lass 
than six months time,which would encroach on the monopoly 
of the Bank of England. It might n*©t discount bills of 
exchange or notes, or keep bookh of account for any 
individual or group of individuals. (3) 
provisions which throw much light on the legal 
status and protection afforded goint stockholders may 
be briefly summarized. Transfers of stock were to be 
(1) 9 Anne,c.21,sec.32* 
(2) Ibid, sec*25* 
(3) Ibid,sec.43* 
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under the regulation of the Queen, none but voluntary 
transfers to be valid. (1) Stock was declared a personal 
estate, to pass to the executor and not to a deceased 
holder's legal heirs.(2) s t o o k certificates and the annual 
interest were to be exempt from government taxation.(3) 
Holders of stock might sit in Parliament. They could not 
be adjudged bankrupt, and their shares were not to be 
subject to foreign attachment proceedings. (4) Guardians, 
executors,trustees and mortgagees, who held tallies of 
the specified classes as a trust wire the only persons 
required under the act to subscribe into the capital 
stock*(5) 
Finally since it was "of the greatest conseqts«Bce 
to the honour and welfare of this kingdom and for the 
increase of the strength and riches thereof and for the 
vending the products and manufactures,goods and merchand** 
ises of or brought into this kingdom and the employment 
of the poor,that a trade should be carried on to the 
South Seas and other parts of America" the coporation thus 
oreeated was granted a monopoly from jpLgaat 1,1711, of the 
!1) 9 Anne,c.21,sec.36. 
2) Ibid,sec.37. 
3) Ibid, sec. 38. 
4) Ibid,eec.42. 
5) Ibid,sec. 39. 
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born on board thecompany's ships or in plaoes under its 
jurisdiction ware to be deemed natural born subjects of 
Great Britain. (1) No general emba^to was to suffice to 
detain any company ship from leaving British ports. (3) 
In the interests of the East India company,the goit h 
Sea traders were forbidden to sail to the south Seas by 
any other route than through the Straits of Magellan, or 
to trade in the manufactures of c ^ i ^ I n d i a or Persia,or 
in any ports belonging to the East India Company. (3) 
Although the act is long and involved,many of its 
sixty-six sections seeming either contradictory or 
superfluous,there seems no reason to doubt that the 
provisions for the constitution of the corporation and the 
regulation of such trade as it might undertake reflected 
the bast judgment of the time with regard to joint-stock 
organisation. Nevertheless a vital weakness in the very 
nature of the project constantly forces itself into the 
for a-ground. In its one great object to provide full 
•ecurity for the unsecured debts of the nation,the act 
was on its face a failure. The funds were hopelessly iqp 
sufficient to give any real assurance that their appropriation 




would increase the credit of the government in the least 
degrte* Yet it would appear from the structure of the 
act that Harley had commenced work on the project with 
this very notion that funds alone could be provided to 
support the credit of the government. Through the first 
twenty-fomr sections of the completed act there is barely 
a reference to a coporate body. They & and as a logical 
whole,forming a funding act for the debts in question, 
which might be administered through a government office 
or any other agent at* will* with the twenty-fifth article 
oomes a new preamble and provisions for a corporate 
organization with a trading monopoly follow* Between 
the two parts of the act there appear repititions with 
^tgard to interest payment and persons eligible to 
membership. These observations tend to suppdfrt the 
suggestion that as an after-thought, to bolster up an 
inadequate legislative act,Harley had felted on the 
clamorous glovernment creditors a corporate organization 
and corporate rights and responsibilities which they had 
neither sought for,nor had any necessarfrymotive to 
desire* The Bank and the East-India Company had it ia 
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true been commercial ventures financed by government 
creditors* sat in these cases the government had secured 
new loans from the promoters to ensure grants of privi-
leges they zealously sought* Never before had the 
government undertaken to force an unorganized,heterogeneous 
body of petty creditors to undertake a trade in which 
they had neither interest nor talent, and for which they 
might themselves fail to command the requisite credit* 
for 
Fortunately,> . this bill to "provide for the debts 
of the nation*, enthusiasm was so great that even a 
specious plan had been devised, that no urging of such 
inadequacies couH have had weight. Commoners,Tory and 
Whig alike, had stood aghast at the prospect of ever 
making any provision for the long accumulating debts* 
A>* it was with fear and compassion rather than with 
penetrating criticism that Harley was greeted when on 
March 5,1711,he made the'pro forma? motion that parliament 
make a grant to provide for the unsecured debts of the 
government*(1) Experienced polit icians shook their 
heads at Harley1 s audacity* Members of his own party 
(1) Comm* Sourn* XVI,535. 
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openly avowed their disbelief in his ability to make 
adequate provision for the accumulated debts in addition 
to providing for current expenses. Lord Godolphin declared 
that Harley had Mhung a millstone about his neck."(l) 
The commons reached no resolutions on the first 
day they considered the motion,but the Committee of the 
^ o l e was ordered to sit again on Wednesday,March 7. On 
this day the sitting seems to have been adjourned until 
March 9,the House not meeting on Thursday*(3) gefore 
it met again, Guiscard had made his attempt to stab 
Harley and the head of the ministry was confined to his 
home. Rumor said that his wound would prove fatal* Indig-
nation and sympathy were universal. On meeting the House 
promptly adopted resolutions denouncing the outrage in 
the strongest terms. Then it turned its attention to 
the unfinished business,the resolutions on the public 
debts, and passed them through the Committee of the 
Whole* (3) On March 10,they were reported to the House 
by Mr. Conyers,Harley t s floor-leader, andon being read the 
second time were agreed to without division. (4) 
(1) Port.MSS. ,V,652-3. Memoirs of the Harley Famil7,by 
Edward Harley. "The yhl&B then in the House treated it with 
the utmost ridicule,pleasing themselves that the Chancellor 
had made a proposal which in itself was impossible and that 
therefore it must turn to his own shame and confusion*" 
(2) Comm. Journ. XVI, 538* (3) Ibid, 540. (4) Ibid, 541-2. 
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Public business languished furing the illness and 
convalescenee of garley*(1) The unsecured debts remained 
with the bare acknowledgement by Parliament of the 
obligation for over two months* However the opportunity 
was seized by Edward Harley,Auditor of the Exchequer and 
his brother's right hand man, to prepare the act in 
detail* "No assistance was received from the offices 
principally concerned in the debt",writes the auditor, 
"and for many reasons it was absQlutely necessary to conceal 
the methods 4n doing it till the bill was perfected*"(2) 
One of these reasons certainly was to forestall atoy 
possible speculation in the government bills in questioa* 
Passing as they did at 40 to 45$ discount* a sharp 
speculator convinced that they would rise on the passage 
of the act might have hoped to reap a profitable harve* 
on an early investment* It was desired that the benefits 
of the act accrue to genuine creditors of the government* (3) 
On April 25,the day before Harley returned to 
the House of commons, a caucus of forty or fifty moderate 
members was held at which the plan of the proposed 
Company was revealed*(4) It was approved with the greatest 
Jii s M a r c h 12,1711* "Parliament cannot go 
and are forced to adjourn their money 
business which none but he can help in* Cf.Mar & Kellia MSS* 
p*489* (2) port*MSS*V,653* (3) Harley charges 
some fellow ministers with reproaching him for not letting 
them have some profit out of the deal* Parl*Hist*,7II,xci* 
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enth*wias*& and with surprise at the merit of the project* 
A week later on May 3, Harley presented the plan of the 
South sea company "before the House in committee of the 
whole* (1) The House took under consideration at the same 
time the scheme for a new Two Million Lottery to be 
based on the postal revenues and new duties on hides, 
skins,vellum and parchment. Resolutions embodying the 
*<jLlient features of both were adopted by the committee, 
and on the following day were presented to the House* (3) 
The resolutions as presented may be sum marized 
as follows; (4) To set aside 140,000 pounds a year for 
33 years out of the 700 pounds a week received from the 
Po»toffice,and from duties on hides,skins,vellum and 
parchment,on which to raise a fund not exceeding one and 
one half millions by contributions on annuities^(ii) That 
a fund be given to her Majesty to pay interest at the rate 
of 6$ on the several public debts in the Navy,ordnance 
and Victualling departments and other out standing debts,to 
Constitute a fund redeemable by Parliament^ (iii) That 
for this purpose the impositions laid by the act of 8 Anne, 
c.13,imposing duties on coal,culm etc*,be continued 
6 
(1) Comm. Journ. XVI, 635. Port.MSS.IV,683* 
(3) Ibid,XVI,636* 
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forever;(iv) that all tallies issued since the eighth 
year of Queen Anne's reign be engrafted into the same 
general fund; (v)that the duties on candles etc* be granted 
forever; (vi) that the proprietors of the said debts and 
deficiencies be incorporated to carry on the trade to 
the sotlifch geaa* (vii) that to whatever extent the said 
rates and duties faL 1 short of supplying the annual fund, 
the deficiency shall be paid out of the first aids granted 
by Parliament thereafter* The resolutions were 
placed immediately on second reading, and after a verbal 
change,were passed, it was ordered that a bill or bills 
be brought in by Mr. C°nyers,the chancellor of the 
exchequer,sir Thomas Powys,the Attorney-General, the 
solicitor-General,Mr.Auditoi Harley and William Lowndes.(1) 
The committee at once divided the resolutions into two 
sections and the lottery proposal was brought in the 
following Monday in the form of a aeparate bill. (2) 
Gxeat popular enthusiasm seems to have greeted the 
Imtrodiction of the S&uth Sea projeft*,the measure that 
"will pay off the nation's debts",as ignorant friends 
flJL) These men seem to have formed the usual group to which 
budgetary proposals were referred in this Parliament for 
embodiment in bills* 
(2) Comm. Journ.XVI,637* It was not passed,however until 
jufce 4. 
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declared. Lady JDupplin,the daughter of jj&rley,wrote 
enthusiastically to her aunt that the report had 
passed without opposition. "It has caused great 
rejoicing",she declared," there were bonfires and 
ringing of bells in the city last riightj it is a 
glorious thing."(1) However,the same day swift exp 
pressed impatience to know tto&t the proposals were*(2) 
Already there were powerful forces at work against 
the project. The very fact that it was being hailed 
with so much eclat by the Tories was sufficient to 
render it an object of suspicion in the eyes of the 
opposing party. Proprietors of the debts in question 
themselves protested against the measure,no doubt 
mainiy against the proposed trade to the south Seas*(3) 
To offset the Whig murmurings,Lord Halifax was called 
into consultation on the bill and seems to have offered 
suggestions of considerable weight* These may have been 
rather of political significance than affecting t&e 
character of the project itself*(4) 
;i)Port*MSS*IV,683* May 3,1711* 
^2) Swift Corresp.1,254.gRift to Peterborough,May 4,1711* 
\3) Port.MSS*V, . "Several of both parties set them-
selea to embarrass it,thinking it would be too great a 
credit to the Chncellor to accomplish so vast an under-




Not until May 17 did conyers present to the 
House the bill "for making good deficiencies and for 
satisfying the public debts, and for erecting a corpor-
ation to carry on a trade with the South Seas,"$l) 
On the same day the bill/ was read and passed tto second 
reading. On the following day it.was read the second 
time and committed to the whole House to be considered 
on May 31* (3) On this same day(May 18) a petition 
was presented from the East India Company, setting 
forth its claim "to the whole trade to the fast Indies, 
in the counties and places of Asia,Afai<0a and America, 
beyond the Cape of Good Hope to the Magellan Straits." 
The petition argued that the south Sea project "will not 
only be injurious to us the petitioners,but a discourage-
ment to all others who have or may lend money upon 
Parliamentary funds." It was requested that the c°s|>any 
be heard on the bill, and it was ordered that they might 
be heard by counsel. (3) It is presumed that this hearing 





it evidently exerted no effect on the ultimate nature 
of the bill* 
The act was considered in committee oft he 
fhole on Monday,May 31, and again on May 34, on which 
latter date it was agreed to report the bill with 
aaeendments* (1) The following day this report was made and 
amendments were adopted requiring the board of directors 
to be chosen by the stockholders; the first board and 
the first governor however were to be designated by the 
ftueen* Three other amendments were introduced in open 
House and passed without apparent division. (3) One of 
great important was a clause providing that the Company 
should accept and employ a stock to carry on a fishery. 
This clause apparently incorporated into the bill by 
chance later became the basis for one of the most 
active and at the same time unprofitable portions of the 
Company's business* tJ second amendment gave the company 
permission to export unwrought iron to Spain* A third 
applied a rule laid down earlier in the session against 
'interlocking directorates' and provided that no director 
of the south Sea company might be at the same time a 
(1) Comm. journ. XVI, 678* 
(3) Ibid, 678* 
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director of either the Bank of ^ngland or the Cast India 
Company* Amendments were also offered barriSTg the 
company from discounting bi^ls, and providing that 
persons should not be forced to enter the company. These 
were withdrawn on the ground that they were already 
provided for in the bill* 
With these alterations the bill was ordered 
engrossed. On Monday,May 38,it passed its third reading 
*nemine contradioente?, and was taken up to tie Lords* (1) 
Hot until May 30 was the bill presented iQi the Lords and 
on that day Harley, now farl of Oxford, at tended for the 
first time since his formal introduction into the body 
a week before* (3) The bill was read for the first time 
on this day. On May 31,it was read for a second time, 
considered in Committee of the whole with Lord Delawar 
as chairman ,and reported without amendment* It was 
immediately read for the third time and passed. (3) 
The bill received the signature of the queen on June 13*(4) 
(I) Comm.journ,XVI,680* 




FISCAL USEFULNESS OF THE COMPATO 
* it* ti* t»* n* ii* it* n* n* ft* ri* 
Despite our gloomy anticipations as to the probable 
success of the south sea act in its principal object, its 
passage seems to have at least partially answered the pur-
pose for which it was intended* It taised the value of 
government bills from 10 to 30 per cent on their par 
value; it materially reduced the cost of government 
supplies; it greatly strengthened the financial position 
of the government in the city* 
Here at last was something definite which the 
government had to offer to the moneyed men in the way of 
constructive financial legislation* If it was a make-
shift,it at lea»t violated no fundamental laws of sound 
fiscal policy. If the promises of interest for the next 
five years were to be fulfilled litTtle differently than 
frhey had been for the past three, Parliament had at last 
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latter result was only gradually being realized,the fact 
that the discount rate for tallies was rising at all was 
a hopeful circumstance that could not fail to have 
progressive effects* 
This upward tendency in golwrnment or edit,howevert 
was not the result of any spontaneously unanimous enthus** 
iasm on the part of government creditors for the new 
project. In the House of rpmmons the proprietors of the 
debts in question had protested vigorously against the 
As soon as passed memorials began to come in from 
various government offices. The undertakers of tlm hos~ 
J 
£jfcfcals for sick and wounded at Plymouth and Portsmouth 
were the first to complain at the hardship of being put o|$ 
with paper security when it was money they wanted.(1) 
gome creditors of long standing raised a similar protest* 
The south ^ea act had provided that the Hanover subsidy 
long Overdue might be paid in south Sea stock. The shrewd 
Elector made a vigorous effort to secure payment of this 
9,375 pounds in money,or at best with 30$ additional 
stock to csover the prevailing discount. Only as a last 
resort just before Christmas, 1711 when the books closed 
(1) Cal•Treas.CXXXIV,46. June 34,1711* 
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did he enter his debt on the company's register, (1) com-
plaints of similar nature followed for over a year after 
the passage of the act*(#) 
In spite of the beneficent effects of the ndw 
provision for outstanding debts,the fall of 1711 had 
witnessed anouther serious depression ton the money 
market. On the last day of A^guat culminated a serioua 
crash of thepublic stocks.(3) the aame time the 
government faced the problem of contracts for pork and beef 
for the aalmy. ^ith bills fallen again to 35 $ below paBC| 
extravagant rates seemed the best the government could 
secure. (4) Contractors in the navy who had previously 
made arrangements to serve the government declared their 
"inability to comply with their contracts on account of the 
high discount on navy bills andthe uncertainty of their 
(1) Macpherson papers,II,365-6. ^lector to Kreyenberg,the 
resident at London,November 10,1711* 
(3) On Jan.39,1713,the Commissioners of ordnance complain 
that their bills three jrears in arrear had been paid in 
gouth Sea stock which was at a great discount* a minute 
suggests that a portion of their claim was settled in 
specie* Cal.Treas.CXLIII,39* July 31 of the same year,the 
Commissioners of sick and Wounded geamen forward a letter 
to them from one ^illiam woolley,a merchant who complains 
"that the tradesmen have lost 30^ on the south Sea account 
and it is now going on three-quarters of a year." Cal* 
yreas.CL,30. nf.Ibid,CXL,55* 
C3J Port.MSS.V,79.Halifax to Oxford,Aug.30,1711* 
(4) Cal.^reas.CXXXVI,65. Aug.30,1711* 
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payment11, to some officials it seemed that "nothing but a 
full stop in the affairs of the navj could be expected 
unless an immediate remedy were applied. "(1) what that 
remedy was does not appear from records at hand* Doubt-
less Lord Oxford1s tact found some way of satisfying 
immediate demands with partial payments, ^t any rate in 
the midst of the confusion,the Queen issued the charter 
of Great Britiim 
for "The Governor and Company of jjarchants/trading to 
the south 8eas>and other parts of Amerioa, and for 
encouraging fishery." (3) stocks normally recovered soon 
after. Dutch money found its way into the new organization(S) 
and by November its stoc$ was quoted at 77^.(4) 
But the usefulness of the south sea Company in the 
fiscal policy of the government did not end with the for-
mation of the proprietors of the unsecured debts into a 
trading company. Clauses in the act itself had provided 
for continued service of the south Sea stock. Hundreds of 
thousands of pounds of tallies,due-bills and debentures, 
(1) Ca1.T*eas*CXXXVT1,33. Sept.10,1711. 
(3\ The charter was dated September 7,1711. 
(3) port.MSS.V,49. John jjrummond sold 1,500 pounds of Bank 
stock to buy shares in the new ompany. 
(4) Anderson; History of Commerce,IIIf46« 
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which had never been paid out for government obligations, 
but wnicn were in the hands of paymasters in readiness 
to be so used, were ordered to be subscribed into the 
stock of the new company, ^lmost two millions and a half 
of South. gea stpkk was 00 subscribed 11 for the use of the 
public".(1) 
As early as october,1711,the *ule had been laid 
down that contracts which were made for transport ser-
A 
vice of the army in Flanders before the end of that month 
should be discharged by payments in the form of south 
Sea stock. (3) At the same time,orders were issued to pay 
the King of Portugal for the barrels of powder overdue 
through the south Sea Con$pany#(3) After 1713,however, 
South sea stock became more available for fiscal pur-
poses by reason of further legislation, in this year the 
lottery bills carried with it a rider making it lawful 
for the government offices to borrow money on south sea 
stock in their possession as security.(4) This faofelitated 
(1) 3,371,403 l . , 7s . , ld . had been so subscribed by 
Christmas,1713. comm.Journ.XVII, 514. 
(3) October 3,1711.Cal. treas.CXXXVIII,9. Cf.Ibid,CXLVII,80 
where the rule was applied on May 38,1713. 
(3) October 3,1711.Ibid,CXXXVIII,7. i3,905 bbls.of powder 
gjpieJbn^Maroh , 1711 ,the amount due amounting to 
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borrowing on a margin without impairing the credit of 
the stock as a whole, ĵ nd during the last two years of 
Oxford's administration,this device was made almost 
constant use of as a financial expedient* 
In January, 1713,for example,payments of claims 
in §outh soa stock were suspended for several days while 
opportunity was given the puliic to advance money upon 
the stock as security,(1) By January 34,130,000 pounds 
had been so borrowed, and the money raised was devoted 
to the benefit of pressing claims in the office of the 
Sick and pounded. (3) Other warrants for the borrowing of 
money were issued soon after this date.(3) A year later, 
in March,1714, a syndicate, loan of 500,000 pounds came due 
which had been placed on the security of south sea stock.(4) 
A margin of 156,000 pounds had been allowed in this case 
on the stock. In other words the stock had been mortgaged 
for 75% of its par value* In the same month,lord 
Treasurer Oxford was reminded of the maturity of a loan 
1) Cal. «jireas. CXL, 55. 
3) Ibid,CLIII,9. To pay exchange on bills to the American 
colonies for instance. 
(3) Ibid,CLVIII,36. ^ list of such warrants,the last being 
dated aanuary 36,1713. 
(4) xCbid, CLXXIV, 13* 
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for 55:^000 pounds on 70,000 pounds of stoc#*(l) It 
would appear that at this time nearly all of the stock 
originally taken for the use of the public had eitSe r 
been pledged as security or had been paid outright in 
settlement of obligations* ^t least the transport con** 
tractors were compelled to wait from ^arch 3 to July 19 # 
1714 to get a pressing claim paid even in stock. (3) 
Special arrangement,however,could be made in this year for 
the direct payment of all bills of exchange from Spain 
on the victualling office in south sea stock. (3) o t l l e r 
transactions might also be cited,illustrating the 
serviceableness of these securities in thP extension of 
the credit of the government. (4) 
Although the stock itself remained beloew par 
until after the death of Queen irme^it steadily rose as 
it neared the commencement of the interest funds. The 
growing commercial activities of the coirpany lent 
(1) Cal.Treas.CLXXIV,31. 
(3) Ibid,CLXXIII,39* John ward to william Lowndes,Mar. 
3,1714, and minutes,April 34 and July 19* 
(3} Ibid, CLXXII,31. Cf *also Ibid,CLXXV,13 and 35. 
(4) Such as a genoese loan of 180,000 pounds on south 
Sea security which came due on August 39,1713.problems 
arising from this absorbed much of the time of King 
George's first treasury board.Cal.Treas.CLXXX, 16,Aug. 
16,17145 and passim,ff« 
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additional speculative value to the securities. Complaint 
at being put off with trading stock instead of gold had 
practically ceased on the part of government creditors 
by the end of the Oxford administration* to glance 
forward beyond the chronological limits of this discussion, 
it may be noted that one of the first steps of the 
Hanoverian ministry was to dispose of a large amount of 
the stock which had been in public hands. Book® were opened 
for this purpose on September 11,1714, and possibly on one 
or two days following. a result there was sold ( it 
is not known whether or no at a discount) 885,703 l . # 
14s.,7d. in south sea stock. (1) Payments were made weekly 
(3) 
for this until November 6. with the rise of the company 
as a commercial? institution,the impropriety of the 
©vernment remaining a large stockholder was evident. It 
was n<ht long until its holdings were disposed of entirely 
at good rates. 
(1) Cal.Treas. CLXXX,36,39,49-53,57. 
(3) Ibid,XXXII,4. 
Chapter Fire. 
THE SOUTH SEA TRADE AND UTRECHT. 
* ft* tt* ft* ft* »* t!*H* H* H* 
It has taken no extended investigation to perceive 
that in the framing of the South sea project the feature of 
the South sea trade itself had been only an incidental 
factor, while such a trade had long been urged by 
British publicists and statesmen as desirable,it was not 
a matter of pressing concern to the ministry that it be 
developed at this time. It could be seen that as peace 
jwospects grew brighter,it would be decidedly for British 
interests to have made a start toward an extension of the 
West Indian trade. But that stability of the ministers 
in power,the faith and integrity of the government were 
not concerned. On the other hand, a sound,vigorous finanr-
cial policy as has been noted was an unavoidable condition 
precedent to the establishment of a European peace on 
favorable terms to England. Far-sighted provision for the 
unsecured debts could alone re-establish the blemished 
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credit of the nation, with credit still badly shaken the 
ministry could hardly hope to survive another session of 
Parliament. 
In the process of making adequate provision for 
the debts of the nation, the grant of a monopoly of the 
South Sea trade to the company of government creditors 
was an afterthought resorted to in order to provide an 
additional inducement for creditors to have confidence in 
the government. The trade was neither sought by these 
credit or d, nor desired by a large body of them. The 
difficulties and uncertainty which it involved could not 
but be apparent to the more influential merchants. But 
to the generalty,the prospects of South-Sea trade threw a 
glamour about the makeshift plan for paying the interest 
on depreciated debts. It clothed a barren,technical, 
financial project with the shining raiment of golden hopes 
and untold riches to be realized in the land of 1 Westward 
Ho1. It played on dreams of English greatness in the 
southern half of the New world,cherished in populat tra** 
dition from the days of Francis Drake and Sir Walter 
Raleigh. But its connection with Harleyfs funding project 
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was in no way a necessary one and its undertaking came near 
to failing altogether. 
It is a remarkable fact that despite incessant 
agitation for over a century for a coispany to trade to 
South America,but two attempts had been made prior to the 
South Sea Company to actually establish such a society. 
AS early as 1634,ambitious promoters had urged a lest 
Indian Company on the House of Commons,but no action was 
taken, (1) with Cromwell came t$e foundations of British 
colonial policy and at the same time a more determined 
effort to send a commercial colony to the Indies* The 
plan was pushed in 1657 and 1658 by Martin Noel and 
Thomas Povey, and some steps seem to have been taken to 
put it into effect, (3) With the accession of William 
III,the English government entered upon a vigorous mercantile 
policy, and it was immediately pressed by inter ested pro-
West 
jectors to make forward steps in the/Indies. In satis*? 
** 
faction of this demand a company was actually set on foot, 
(1) Anderson: Hist,of Commerce,III,43. 
(3) Andrews; 
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this time by the Scotch Parliament, to establish a 
colony at Darien on the isthmus of Panama, owing to 
devastating fever and misunderstanding withr regard to 
supplies for the colony, it was given up within a month 
as a failure* But its promoter,William Paterson the 
founder of the Bank of ^ngland,did not lose faith in his 
idea. He continued to urge both in England and Scotland 
another trial of his project,or the undertaking of some 
other adventure in the same direction.(1) 
Just before the death of King ^illiam, the per*? 
•4r 
si stent applications of paterson and of Defoe, who was 
also an 'original1 West India man, had induced hi»^ to 
make plans for an immediate expedition to the West 
Indies.(3) With this in vfc&w,England1s possible interest 
in the Indies was made a point of special stipulation in 
the Grand Alliance. By the seventh article of the treaty 
(1) Paterson; A Proposal to Plant a Colony in Darien 
1701* Works,I,115-60. 
(3) Paterson had advised^ "the seizing upon the principal 
ports of the west Indies,by which he (the king) might 
be enabled not only to carry on the war at the expense of 
his enemies, but open and secure a; direct trade forever 
between these rich and vast continents of Mexico and 
Peru and this kingdom.n Paterson1 s ^orks,II,74-80. 
Defoe's pi an, which he asserts King William approved, 
was to plant a colony in c^il® which he claimed was far 
richer in gold than either Peru or Guinea. port.MSS.V, 
58-61. Defoe to Harley,July 33,1711. See also Defoe's 
Review, VIII, 105* 
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the Emperor guaranteed to England the possession of all 
places she might seize in the west Indies. The death of 
William left it for Anne's ministers to carry his plans 
into execution. But owing to the failure of the allies to 
cooperate the expedition was abandoned. (1) 
For eight years no further attempts were made to 
carry the war into the west Indies, The war policy of 
the administration,dictated largely by Marlborough,was 
to make the Spanish Low countries the principal seat of 
the war. It was pointed out that by striking at the West 
indies, England might long before have brcught the war 
to a speedy settlement,by cutting off the sourse of the 
French supplies. "At an outlay of 500,000 or 600,000 
pounds,France and Spain might long ago have been at our 
mercy, "wrote Paterson. (3) It is imputing no improbable 
6 
(1) "The Dutch agree to join us next year in sending ships 
and land men to the ^est Indies, "Godolphin to Harley, 
Sept.16,1703. Port.MSS.IV,43* In Port.MSS*IV,596-7,Lord 
Halifax tells Harley in a letter written Sept.19,1710 that 
these plans came to an end on January 7,1703 when the 
vmpreor insisted that all conquered islands should be held 
in his name till the end of the war, and the Dutch 
declared that because of contrary winds and the advanced 
season it would be better for them to employ their troops 
elsewhere. 
(3) Paterson's ^orks,II,74-80,Paterson to Godolphin,Dec. 
13,1709. France had largely taken over the Spanish 
carrying trade formerly held by the English and Dutch and 
from this drew her principal resources for carrying on 
the war. 
76* 
motive® to Marlborough to say that a war brought to a 
successful close in such a manner was undesirable to 
him as adding little lustre to his($frn glory. And yet it 
must be borne in mind that the resources which became 
available to France by carrying the bulk of the Spanish 
trade during the war formed a prime hindrance to the 
gaining of any decisive advantage on the continent. 
The Godolphin cabinet finally became aware of 
th&to fact, with the preliminaries ar Gertruydenberg in 
progress it seemed an excellent time to make a brilliant 
stroke inthe West indies. Over the repeated protests of 
Marlborough plans were begun to make an sexpedition in 
force to seize strategic ports*(1) For-vkrious refcons 
the project was postponed just before the change in the 
ministry* (3) Bat the Harley miinistry entered immediately 
into the plan and seems to have considered starting an 
expedition during October,17iC * (3) Again the scheme was 
•v 
dropped. But the British public wae well prepared by the«e 
frequent proposals of a lest Indian expedition, and when 
(l)Coxe's Marlborough,III.37 and 49.Letteres from Marl-
borough to Godolphin and the Duchess,May 16,May 19,May. 
39 1710 
(2^ Ibid ,III , 136. Marlborough to ,August 4,1710. 
(3) Port.MSS.IV,596-7. Halifax to Harley,Sept. 19,1710, 
Ibid,IV,583-4. Paterson to Harley,Sept.4,1710, 
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in the early spring of 1711 the mysterioas naval 
expedition under c°lonel Hill set sail,it was at once 
assumed that the West Indies formed its destination. (1) 
When these conjectured designs on thw West Indies were 
coupled with the South Sea monopoly soon after proposed, 
the brilliancy of each gainedfavor in the public estim** 
ation* 
The hopes for an advantageous trade to the fest 
Indies and the south Seas which had been kindled by 
pamphleteers rested on the clearest possible application 
of the mercantilist theory. "The poor will be more 
employed in manufactures'1,it was contended,"the product of 
the estates of our landee men will become more valuable and 
the trading part of the nation will be greatly encouraged?(3$ 
(1) Swift Corresp.1,366. Swift to Abp.King, July 12,1711* The 
Hill e:xpedition as is well known was in the end directed 
toward Quebec and ended in utter failure owing to a storm 
at sea. "However there are indications that it was at first 
contemplate to be what everyone supposed it was, anji ex-
pedition to thw West indies. To use it at a distance aSo, 
a convoy for merchant vessels to that quarter seems indicated 
by a letter from st.John to Harley,Jan.8,1711.Port.MSS.IV, 
653. The prospect of gaining land assiatcne from the American 
colonies may have had something to do with the change of 
plans, At any rate Harley did not approve of the expedi-
tion which was finally launched* 
(3) Letter to a Member of Parliament.,,..,May 3,1711* somers 
Tr act-©, XlTlTTlT". — ~ 
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From peru and Mexico it was expected to import gold and 
silver and the richest dye-stuffs. 4 formidable list of 
possible exports promised a heavy balance of trade in 
England1 s favor. Trade is not only absolutely necessary 
to support the present standard of lining in |urope, 
argued the pamphletear already quoted, (1) but more 
especially for defence against ambitious neighbors* That 
is 
trade tm chiefly if not wholly/beneficial which exports 
the superfluity of the growth and manufacture of a nation, 
and brings back in return such real treasure as gold and 
silver and commodities which may be employed in trade or 
re-exported,as indigo and cochineal. Of these treasures only 
South America "is the/inexhaustible fountain" and trade 
to these parts has been engrossed by the French. It was 
time for G*eat Britain to corrpete for this before it was 
too late« Her capacity for carrying on the trade was 
superior,and hsr appearance gives no cause of jealousy of 
designs of universal monarchy. Hencf Spain would find it 
to her interest to encpurgge the trade* 
(1) Note 3,page 77* 
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The same enterprising pamphleteer provides a list of 
commodities which it was thought England might export to 
advantage^ (1) 
"All sorts of woollen goods. 
"Cloth,coarse and fine,sella in the southerly parts of 
Peru towards Chili,and in the northern parts of Maxico* 
"Colchester bays is universally wo«n all over the 
country,white and dyed,and some of these goods are dyed 
of the richest scarlet. 
"Flannels,cottens,serges,commonly called perpetuanos, 
made in Devonshire and sold at ^xeter and some made at 
Colchester,and dyed with all kinds of colours and some of 
rich scarlets. 
"Mixed serges made in ^maarset and sold at Taunton. 
"Shalloons,says,drugget® made in several counties. 
"Worsted stuffs of all kinds,made at Horwich and 
other places. 
"Stuffs mixed with silk,worsted crapes, silk crapes, 
silks of all kinds,velvets,silk handkerchiefs,worsted hose, 
silk hose for men and women,thread hose for men and women, 
hats,beavers and ca*olins,Flanders and fnglish lace,silver 
and rold lace,sister1s thread,sowing silk of all colours* 
"Linens ox all kinds,from the coarsest to the f dnest* 
The vermillions and cotton goods of Lancashire." 
"Callicuts and goods of India. 
"All sorts of iron ware necessary in buildings and in 
country affairs. 
"All sorts of household goods made of iron. 
"Stilliards,scales and weights for gold and silver, 
shear© for cutting gold and silver. 
"Tools of all kinds for carpenters,joiners,smiths etc. 
"Arms,clocks,watches,and many curiosities of iron and 
steel. 
"Glass ware of all sorts. 
"Round coral for necklaces and beads„ 
"Paper,sealing-wax,white wax for tapers,Castile soap, 
pepper,cinammon,cleaves,mace,nutmegs,Cheshire chees,pickles, 
sauces and oil*" 
(1) See note 3,page 77* The emphasis on coloured goods is 
of course to point out the manner in which imparls from 
the south Sea might be converted into higher forms of 
merchandise* 
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But it rau»t have been a daring statesman to have 
founded a company to fund the national debt on a mere hope 
even so widespread as that of an extensive trade to 
Mexico and South j^merica* Though $ngland's first interest 
in the war had been dictated by hopes of attaining con-
spicuous advantages by way of the west India trade,yet as % 
the war was closing she seemed no nearer them than before. 
Expedition after expedition had been proposed and abandoned 
before fairly under way* Trade had languished, jealousies 
of the allies bade fair to make striking gains for any 
of the*9 out of the question* in the meanwhile,the new 
French council of Trade had adopted an aggressive policy 
tff trade e^qpansion in the direction of the west Indies. (1) 
Under cover of conducting Spanish interestson behalf of 
the Duke of An;jou,the Grand Monarch had negotiated the 
privileges of the Assiento,the exclusive slave-trade to 
fche Spanish possessions in the New world for a period of 
ten years,from 1702 to 1712. with this as an opening wedge 
French shipping had forced itself rapidly into the Indian 
market. It seemed to many that so far from being a close 
(1) Amderson,op,cit.111,4 ff* 
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competitor ,Fngland would have a hard struggle to mair>* 
A 
tain any interest at all in the west lndies*(l) 
Harley,however,at the time he presented the 
South Sea act to the House of commons, had in mind hopes 
and expectations which more than outweighed these surface 
considerations. The ministry had not seen fit to undeceive 
any who thought the Hill expedition was to the West Indies* 
Now it went so far as •tyaP intimate that peace negotiations 
were already under way which would certainly result in 
giving ^ngland a secure basis for trade in South Africa* 
It was said that four ports were to be given Great Britain, 
together with adjacent territory.(2) 
(1) ^nderson in his Hiatory of Commerce,III,54-5,declares 
that both the Portuguese and French companies which had 
the 1 Assiento1 lost money in the trade* As he was an 
employee of the south sea Company for forty years immediatey 
after the Bubble,he was in a petition to know the facts* 
Of the profit to the French nation from the carrying trade 
there can be no question,however* The first article of 
the contract with the French Guinea company reads? 
"Ladite Compagnie Franchise de Guinee ayant obtenu la permis-
sion de leur® MajestezfTres-Chretienne,et Catholique,de se 1 
charger de l1assiento,ou introduction des eclaves negres 
dans les Indes Occidentales de l*amerique appertanantes a 
sa Majeste Catholique,afin de procurer par ce moyen ui 
avantage et une utilite rsciproque a leurs dites Maje8tez,et 
aux sujets de lfune et lfautre couronnejoffre et s'oblige, 
tant pour elle,que pour ses directeurs at associez solidafcra*-
ment,dfintroduire dane les dites indes Occidentales appartanr 
antes a sa Majeste Catholiqua,pendant le temps et eapace de 
(con,page 82) 
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The basis for these intimations lay in the 
first propositions of peaoe which had been received from 
the French minister de Torcy on jjpril 23,1711, The very 
first article of these proposals declared, "that the 
Fnglish should have real securities to exercise the&cr 
comnerce hereafter in Spain,to the Indies, and in the 
ports of the Medi terraneaa.n (l) 1 Securities1 could mean 
nothing less than 'places^, ports and trading posts under 
unrestricted title. From these as vantage points,a statef** 
man of lively imagination might conjure up a vision of a 
West Indian empire job pouring its wealth and resources 
into the lap of a grateful mother country. Certainly 
Harley did nptt regard it as beyond the bounds of probab-
ility that the South Sea trade might be developed into a 
great British asse<tt from even so limited a basis* 
(l,oon. from page 81. )y. dix annees qui commenceront au 
premier Mai de l'annee prochaine 1703,at finiront a parail 
jour de l*annee 17l2,quarante huit mille negres pieces ~ 
dfInde,des deux sexes et de tous ages,lesquels ne seront 
point tirez des pays de Guinee,qufon nomme Minas et Cap 
Vert,attendu que les negres les dits pays ne sont pas 
propres pour les dites Indes Occidentalesj c1 est-a-dire, 
quatre mille huit cens negres chague annee." Quoted in 
BurtonsReign of Queen Anne >11%222* 
(3) Anderson,op.cit.III,43* 
(1) Pari.Hist.,VII, Appendix,?*/*. 
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Objections were not slow to be raised,however.The 
very possibility of imperial expansion on the basis of such 
concessions seemed to demonstrate the futility of hoping 
for them. £jutPh,French and Spanish would hesitate long 
before granting Fngland sufficient purchase for that end* 
And without the consent of these powers#how could an 
English trade thrive to parts dominated by her enemies? 
The apparent dilemma was quickly seized upon by the new 
Lord Treasurer's political enemies. Grant us v : liberty 
of commerce from but one aolony in the Spanish West Indies, 
ran the argument,and "Old Spain is r u i n e d . t h e Indies ©re 
of no more va^ue to them*" It seemed manifestly absurd to 
think of Spain consenting to such a measure* "Such i© the 
inconsistency in which you would involved us with your 
fjouth chimera",Oxford1 s opponents miglt cast up to 
him. "On the very face of the matter your 'noble1 project 
is doomed to failure* To saddle so impossible a contrivance 
on the public funds is but to put another hindrance in 
the way of public credit, (1) 
Stung to action by this sharp criticism,the ministry 
hastened to secure in more definite form the promises of 
6 _ _ _ 
(1) Port.MSS. V, 50 ff* Defoe summarizes the argument of 
the Whigs in this letter to L°rd Oxford,July 17,1711* 
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France with regard to the West Indian trade, accordingly, 
to make specific demands for the American commerce 
formed one of the principal parts of the instructions of 
Matthew prior when sent as ambassador to the court of 
France the following month. The elimination of France 
as a principal competitor in the Indies was the o$>jedt 
desi:cdd^ to gain what seemed to have formed a chief source 
of her strength,namely the Assiento, was an immediate 
aim. prior1s instructions were in part:(l) 
"That the Assiento should be entirely in the hand 
of Great Britain; and that France nor no other should 
pretend to meddle with it,but Britain enjoy it after 
the peace as the French do now.,.. 
n$nd that all things in America should continue 
in th& possession of those they should be found to be 
in at the conclusion of the <pt#ace* 
"T^at all advantages or liberty of commerce that 
has been or shall be granted to the French by the 
Spaniards shall be equally granted to the subjects of 
Great Britain." 
These instructions are dated July 1,1711* On the 
twelfth,prior had his first appointment with M.de Torci. 
The discussion turned at once to the question of 1 securities! 
prior argued that on the basis of earlier treaty arrange-
ments this term could only mean 'places1 for colonizing. 
England wishes settlements in the Spanish west Indies,he 
(1) Pari.Hist* VII, appendix,civ-cv. 
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urged,to protect her ships from pirates and robbers,and 
the protectionso provided would be equally available for 
the Spanish* "You will never make Spain believe*,declared 
Torci,"that it is for her advantage to take away their 
country. " England would soon fortify any places which 
the Asaisnto might give her, "This article is impossible 
to be granted",he concluded. "It is impossible to make 
peace on any other terms,"replied the ^nglish agent. (1) 
ujith the issue thus definitely joined at the 
outset,it is evident that at this point in the progress of 
peace negotiations ..,the west Indian trade was the most 
important question. Conferences between Prior and Torci 
continued over the matter,tery little else of importance 
being considered at length. On ^uly 14,prior suggested 
that four trading places ©n the continent ©f south 
jtmerica would satisfy ^nglish requirements, (s) On the 
sixteenth,the South Sea Company brought for the first time 
specifically into the negotiations with respect to the 
projected trade,was the main topic of debate. (S) 
South sea Company makes a great deal of work",remarked 




Torci. "The Dutch are surprised at it . " was assured 
that England was only looking cu t for her own interest 
at last, but that the project would not hurt Europe. 
"You will never comvince us of that",was the decisive 
reply* 
^fter several further complimentary conferences 
this negotiation came to a close* But one definite 
thing was accomplished. That was the sending of M.Mesmager 
erer to England" with full powers to treat with regard to 
preliminary conditions for a European peace. Like the 
embassy ©f prior to France, an endeavour was made to keep 
this mission wholly secfiet. The fact that it was being 
carried on was soon found out; but the negotiations 
remained unknown to all but a chosen few. The more 
significant of the agreemtfrifc which France and England 
entered into at the close were suppressed entirely* 
From the technical point of view of progress 
toward a general peace,the articles signed by Mesnager and 
Bolingbroke were only a series of preliminary stipulations 
to go into effect on the conclusion ©f a general peace in 
Europe. They also conditioned the ultimate character of 
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that peace, ^nd from that point of view they are of 
prime importance* The settled with finality as far as 
France and England were concerned the possession of the 
Assiento and the attendant rights of settlement that 
England had asked for. The agreement surrendered to 
practically all the English demands in the west Indies in 
return for concessions elsewhere* The mutual stipulations 
with regard to thawest-India trade are to be found in 
articles five,six and seven, (l) 
"Article V. British Demand.*? The Assiento contract 
shall be made with the English after the same manner 
that the French now possess it; and such places in 
Spanish America shall be allotted to those interested 
in the said comjmerce for the refreshment and sale of 
nefroes as shall be thought necessary or convenient* 
"French Answer- The English shall have after the 
peace concluded,the treaty of negroes of Guinea to 
the west Indies,alias,the j^ssiento contract,upoa the 
same conditions that the convention was made by the 
King of Spain with the French; so that the said 
company which will be established for this effect in 
England shall have the prerogatives of refreshing, 
vending and selling their negroes in all the places 
and ports of ^merica upon the North Seas,in that of 
Buenos res, and generally in all the places and 
porta wherein the importation was permitted to the 
ships of the company formed in France under the 
name of the Assiento* 
Article six contains the fmost-favored-nationl stipulation 
with regard to the Spanish trade* article seven goes 
(1) Par 1.Hist.VII,Appendix, cvi-ex. French Answers "to 
British Preliminary Demands* 
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on to specify eertain ports which the British asked far 
and which France conceded. It was agreed that the contract 
should be made for thirty years; that Great Britain 
should be granted the island of St*Christopher outright; 
and that dan extent of land on the river de la Plata be 
assigned to the British company for the refreshment and 
sale of negroes subject to the inspection of Spanish 
agents* 
But if assurances of a trade to the West Indies 
had been gained from Francd,this should promise nothing 
with regard to the attitude of the allies toward such a 
positive advantage for the English, Indeed,it may well be 
suspected that de Torci!s dddden willingness to comply 
with the ^nglish demands may have been grounded in the 
hope that serious jealousies amqng the allies might arise 
in con©equence* 
indications were not long wanting to show that 
this would be the case* Dutch merchants and officials 
were tremendously interested in the passage of the South 
Sea act* They crowded Drummond with questions as to its 
nature andprobable success* As soon as they understood 
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the plan well enough to admire it,their jelousy began 
to rise, as early as June, 1711,/meterdam burghers had begun 
to plan a "Dutch south sea Company" to compete with the 
English organization.(1) In the belief that the Hill 
pxpediti 
on was only a preliminary military maneuvre to 
seize ports for the new company, the plans of the Dutch 
followed similar lines. An expedition ©f six men-of-war, 
supported by 1200 to 1500 land troops was to be landed 
some pkace on the coast of Mexico, ^rtisans and military 
engineers were to be taken along, and SCO negroes shipped 
from gurinam to engage in mine development. The official 
approval of the Admiralty and of Pensionary Buys rested 
on the project. Of the total stock,ane-third was reserved 
for the coporation of Amsterdam,one-third for the society 
of the Surinam, and one-third was to be thrown open to 
public subscription. Through this "West India Company* as 
it came to be known was voiced the Dutch opposition to 
English monopoly i<h the South Seas* 
The fact that England,presumably for ghe benefit 
if her South sea Company, had secured a grant of the 
(1) Port.MSS. V,9. John prummond to Oxford, June 15,171^1* 
I bid, 34. Sam* to same,June 37* I bid, 28, same to same,July 3* 
One Admiral Somelsdyck was promoter of the design and 
seems to have been Drummond's informant* 
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Assiento and factory rights from France,was not slow t© 
become known* The instructions given the English pleni-
potentiaries to Utrecht gave a prominent place t© the 
question of the West Indian trade,and in pursuance of their 
orders it soon became necessary to disclose to all the 
world the exact privileges which #ngland expected to 
receive* The instructions provided in the second article; 
f,That the contract called the Assiento for fur-
nishing slaves to the Spanish west Indies be pM&e for the 
term of thirty years with such of our subjects as shall 
be by us nominated and appointed ah© shall enj©y all the 
prerogatives and privileges and advantages which were 
yielded to the French by a contract made with them in the 
year 1703,©r which shall appear necessary or reasonable^ 
particularly you are to insist that some extent ©f 
ground on the river Plate may be assigned upon which ©ur 
subjects may not only refresh their negroes,but keep the» 
in security until they shall be disposed of t© the 
Spaniards.1 * 
jealousy was immediate* T^e Dutch did not feel so much 
uimbrage at the slave-trade,11 as the trade it might give 
introduction t©.ff(2) *The whole republic*,a prominent 
Dutch official is quoted as saying, tthas become jealous of 
the strength and growth ©f your ^ast India c°mp any. Hundreds 
would be ruined by a fall of ©ur west India society11, 
which he intimated would result from insistence ©n this* 
1} Pari. Hi at. VII, Appendix, cxxvi-cxxxii.Dec*23,1711* 
2) port.MSS. V, 147-9. D^um a-end to Oxford,Mar.4,1713* Van 
der Duasen is the man quoted. He wished that"anything,though 
not worth 100 pounds a year could be found out for the 
benefit ©f the Dutch to remove all ground ©f jealousy*1* 
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Through March and April,1712,negotiations at Utrecht revolved 
around the persistent demands of the Dutch to be given 
some positive advantage for themselves in the West Indies. 
To take this position,the Dutch were strongly urged by 
whig correspondents in England. (1) They were assuredd 
that the ministry could not hold Parliament together on the 
matter of the peace with France;that the South Sea 
Company was a failing project; and that its directors 
would refuse to undertake a trade at all* 
These considerations suggested the form ©f the 
concessions wfciSch the Dutch request%d at Utrecht. The 
uninhabited island of Porto Rico was the first demand,and 
the second was the assiento ©f negroes t© ttF n©rth side 
of the West Indies. (2) Tentative assurances ©f b©th 
were given By Drummond,the private agent of the government 
at Amsterdam. Port© Rico was felt <bo be worthless,but he 
could guarantee that if the West India Company thought 
it beneficial to its trade that it would be give® them* 
With regard to the assiento,Drummond declared "that in 
case the ?n$lish south Sea Company should not be able t© 
(1) Port.MSS. V, 158-61. Drummond to Oxford,April 4,1713* 
(2) Ibid. 
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perform the whole assiento of negroes,that they should 
oblige themselves to employ the Dutch for thefcr assist-
ance. n (l) 
The Dutch,however,sought something more certain 
than the whig insinuations that the South sea Company 
would be unable to perform the contract. The gritieh 
Parliament had already granted to the South Sea Company 
a monopoly of trading rights in the South Seas and to the 
Orinoco on the eastern coast. This grant could not be 
imparled by treaty stipulations. It embraced a market, 
indeed,to which the sagacious Dutch did not so eagerly 
care to venture. However the Assieh*© <© ntraot which 
England was to receive from France and Spain extended 
throughout New Spain from Buenos A7res t© Mexico. This 
was a region in which the Dutch were very jealous t© 
preserve whatever advantage they might possess* Recognizing 
this feeling,Jfhn Drummond advised the Lord Treasurer*? 
wIf you can wither procure or will at least show your ut-
most endeavours to obtain for the Dutch or for their 
West India Company the Assiento of negroes to the north 
(1) Port.MSS.V, 147-9. Drummond to Oxford,Mar.4,1713* 
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parts of the SPanish West Indies,viz,-to Carthagena and 
Portobello. . . . they will hasten matters to your satis-
faction."(1) 
Nothing seems to have come of these negotiations. 
Through the summer of 1712,the south sea Company was 
showing signs of commercial activity and was laying plans 
for sending several cargoes to the Indies. (2) This 
Effectually put a stop to Dutch hopes that it would give 
up its trading rights. ^ reaction againit France was setting 
in at the same time as was inevitable. Even during the 
spring negotiations,the Grand pensionary Heinsius expressed 
his decided fear of French mastery in the we*t indies. To 
fcheok the possibility he foresaw that the Dutch would 
have to share trade advantages with the English. (3) But 
the grant of New Mexico and Louisiana by the French king to 
Antoine Croaat in October, 1712 was well calculated to give 
definite shape to lingering fears, although the grant 
included land to which British colonial charters had laid 
claim,the English ministry made no protest to France. But 
(1) Por t. M33. V, 158- 81. Drummond to Oxf or d, Apri 1 4,1712. 
(3) Anderson,op.cit.111,45-6. In July, 1712,200,000 pounds 
in sealed bonds were issued by thedirectors to finance the 
expedition. See infra,page 
(3) port.MSS.V,155. Thomas Harley to Oxford,April 4,1712. 
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there is no doubt that the Frenhh blunder in making the 
grant was made good use of in inducing the Dutch to 
concede English privileges in the West Indies. (1) 
No further hindrance to the prigress of the peace 
seem3 to have been offered by the Dutch on the score of 
American commerce. However they did not cease to seek far 
separate trading advantages for themselves at the hands of 
Spain\ In ^ptil,1713,they were demanding the right t© 
send an annual ship to the South Sea on the same basis 
as the English had received the privilege ©f doing. (2) 
In September of the same year they were pressing an 
ftoicissima gens1 or1 most-fav©red-nation1 arrangement 
upon the Spanish ambassadors. In the latter pr©p©sals 
exception was tacitly given in favor ©f "England's rights 
under the Assiento contract,since they had ttc©nsented 
to Hfl&gland already the assiento and ©ne ship yearly to 
the Spanish West Indies. "(3) The Dutch west India com-
pany finally found a trade for itself by undertaking t© 
provide 20,000 negro slaves for the Dutch colonies ©f 
Surinam and Curacao. (4) 
(1) Port.MSS.7,235-7.Drummond to 0arf»rd,Octf14,1712» "Buys 
says they will join heartily with the Q u e e n to prevent the 
French trading t© the South Sea in time ©f peace. 
(2) Ibid,286. Same to same,April 28,1713* 
(3) Ibid,329-30.Same t© same,Sept.11,1713* 
(4) Ibid,363. Same to same,N©v.28,1713« 
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Long before that time,however,the details of the 
Assiento contract hadbiecome a matter ©f separate 
negotiation with Spain by common consent ofthe allies. 
From Amsterdam and Utrecht,the centres of interest in 
the lest Indian trade shifted to London and Madfid* As 
early aa September,1713,the English ministry felt that 
they were "near a conclusion with France*. (1) accordingly 
Lord Lexington had been dispatched to Madrid as ambassa~ 
dor with power to conclude a separate treaty ©f peace 
covering all points at issue between England and Spain. 
Accompanying him on the embassy,©r sent soon after, was 
an obscure commercial expert,Manasses Gilligan,©n whom the 
ministry relisi to work out the details of the contract 
satisfactorily.(2) 
The first difficulty which had t© be overcome was 
an agreement which had just been entered into between 
France and Spain by which the former had been given very 
conspicuous trading rights in return f©ra large grant ©f 
money. For a payment ©f 350,000 crowns t© the Spanish 
crown,the Spanish minister count de Bergheck had premised 
(1) Port.MSS.V,331. 
(3) Also spelled Gylligan,Guillingham,Giligan,Guilligan, 
rind Gillingen.Nothing is known of him except that he was 
a creature ©f X±thur Moore,commissioner ©f Trade and 
PJamtations of whom more anon. 
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France the privilege of sending six ships to trade in the 
South Seas. It was agreed between Gilligan and Monls'el.eoa 
the Spanish agent at Utrecht, before the former left 
either 
for Madrid that/this contract should xzfchax be btooken or 
corresponding liberties granted to England, (l) The pass-
ports for the French company were suspended on his arrival 
in Spain and by February, 1713,the whole project was com-
pletely revoked.(3) The ministry had early recognised 
the need of offering a cash payment to King Philip to 
secure a satisfactory adjustment. It had been suggested to 
loan him 360,000 crown and take the repayment in the form 
of a remission of the drawback on the Assiento contract 
due Spain, (3) The loan of 300,000 pieces-of-eight finally 
embodied in the contract doubtless was the price t&fcch 
England finally paid for breaking the French contract. 
The progress of the negotiations at Madrid was 
facilitated by the good graces of the priaoess des Ursias, 
an experienced intriguante who dominated the Spanish 
court. She took much interest in aecuriag trade advantages 
(1) port.MSS.V,341-3. Bolingbroke to Oxford,October, 1713. 
(3) Ibid,370. Lexington to Oxford,March 6,1713. 
f3j Ibid,359. John Toland to Oxford. ,1713. 
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for England. (1) Not till March 17,1713 was Lord Lexington 
ready to send home the draft of a treaty to which he had 
secured the Spanish seal,(3) He flattered himself that 
it was the best Assiento ever made.(?) The treaty of 
* 
peace and the contract were drawn separately and received 
final ratification at widely varying times. 
The treaty of peace with Spain provided by Article 
twelve,that "151 Pacto de el Assiento de Negros" should 
be enjoyed by such a company as the Queen might designate 
on the same terms as it was held by Kance,from May 1,1713 
for thirty years thereafter. In addition, the Spanish 
king was to make a grant or grants of land in a convenient 
place on the River de la Plata where a settlement might be 
made for the maintaining of negr©esj$>ending their disposal 
to the Spaniards, Permission was given for planting, sowing 
and feeding cattle, and exemption from all duties and 
taxes levied by Spain was gaasnted, The right was reserved 
by the Spanish king to appoint an inspector for the 
(1) Port.MSS,¥,370. "If you would have fruits from the 
A3siento and have things go easily here with the peace,you 
must not balk the princess." Lexington to Oxford,April 6, 
1713,Port.MSS, V,375-6* In a letter written to Oxford on 
July 37,171»,Bolingbroke speaks of "the noble expedient 
they have found out for satisfying this lady,that the 
Queen should give her some of those places she ho las ift 
trust, port.MSS.V,313. , 
(3) Bort.MSS. V,373-3.Lexington to Oxford,Mar, 1 7 , 1 ® . The 
(3) Ibid,370, 
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for the colony, and appeal in case of disagreement as to 
the extent of his powers lay to the Governor of Buenos 
j\yres*(l) .Scarcely a detail is included in this treaty 
draft which had not been specified ever a year before 
in the instructions of the English plenipotentiaries to 
Utrecht* (3) jt is to the ^ssient© contract that we look 
for supplementary features. 
• f the contract itself,no complete copy has been 
available for the purposes of this study * From the pri n** 
a-
cipi.1 sections reprinted in secondary accounts a pretty 
accurate notion may be formed of the conditions which 
adhered to the new contract with Spain.(3) In tUft first 
place,the Queen of ^reat Britain bound herself to furnish 
annually for the S panish west Indies by persons whom she 
might authorize, 4800 negroes of both sexes for thirty 
yearsoommencing May 1,1713. The stipulation was made 
"that the persons who shall go to the lest Indies to carry 
on the business of the assiento,shall take care to do 
(1) Comm. Journ. XVII, 343. The treats? as laid before the 
House was still in the form of a draft signed by Boling-
broke and Monteleon on May 3,1713. 
(3) see supra,page 90, 
(3) The division of profits from the annual ship prol ded 
fir in the osntract will not oome udder consideration ia 
this connection. The only provision in the contract deal^ 
ing with thfefi matter is the clauoe reserving one-fourths 
of ljhe net profits to King Philip. 
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nothing which can be of offense",in which case they 
mould be subject to the same punishment as they would had 
the offense been committed in Spain, (1) 
For the privilege of delivering such negroes,who 
were to be neither defective nor aged, the 'assientists1 
were to pay thirty three and one-third pieces-of~eight 
apiece,which sum covered all customs, ^lcavala1 ,and other 
impbsts which might be levied at Spanish ports in the 
Indies. (3) In additiontto this the company to whom the 
contract might be assigned was to fidvance to the King of 
Spain to meet his pressing needs, 200,000 pieces-of-eight 
iim two equal payments,HL<$hin two and four months respect^ 
irvely after the ratification of the contract. This loan 
wasto run for twenty years and then to be repaid in 
equal amounts of 30,000 pieces-of-eight a year. (3) 
Any time during the first twenty-five years,the 
annual number of negroes imported might be increa## at the 
(1) assiento Contract,sec. 1. ffque les personnes,qui se 
transporteront aux indes Occidentales pour travailler aux 
affaires de l1 assiento,se garderont de rien faire qui puisae 
of fencer; car en ce cas,ils servient poursuivis en justice, 
et punis de la meme maniere,quails I'auroient ete en 
Espagne,suppose qufune faute de la meme nature y eut ete 
commise." By Offense1 seems to have beoa meafct insult to 




he expense of a laterppriod,the company to pay sixteen 
and two-thirds pieces-of-eight additional duties for each 
excess negro so brou^it in.(1) The contract represented 
that it had been a detriment to the welfare of the 
Spanish possessions that the shipments of negroes under 
former 'assientos1 had not been well distributed,and that 
many districts had suffered in conseqiaencd from lack of 
cultivation, accordingly it was made an express condition 
of this c en tract that the English company might import 
and vend negroes in all the ports of the North Sea and 
that of Buenos Ayres at their choice. Negroes carried to 
ports on the windward coast were not to be sold for more 
than three hundred pieces-of-ei^btt and for as much less 
as possible in order to encourage the inhabitants to 
purchase. In other parts of $ew Spain the company might 
sell its wares for all they would bring. 
jt was expressly declared that the French Guinea 
Company was debarred from engaging in this trade* wWhen 
the ,assientists ,are informed that any vessel laden with 
negroes not belonging to them has arrived upon their coasts 
(1) From an abstract of the entire contract in Gal* 
Treas.CLXXVT, 
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or entered any port,they will be permitted to equip,arm 
and put out to sea immediately any vessels which they possess 
or any of those of his catholic Majesty or of his subjects 
with which they may be enabled to take,seize and confis-
cate such vessels and negroes." The right of seartgh on 
suspicion for this purpose after warrant was obtained from 
the governor was promised to the factors of the company. (1) 
The 'assientists' were guaranteed full protection in their 
rights of trade by his catholic Majesty,(2) and it was 
promised that they should be allowed three years in which 
to withdraw their poss%ssions at the expiration of the 
contract,(3) Twelve hundred negroes might be kept at 
the settlement on the Rio de la Plata, (4) 
In addition to these concessions which had been 
held by portigal and France in succession before, England 
secured a new privilege which seemed to promise genuine 
profits to the holders of the assiento* This was the 
permission granted to the conrpany to send one ship annually 
of five hundred tons burden into the ports of the Spanish 
(1) Assiento contract,sec.18, 




west Indies,laden with general merchandise* There was 
a reservation ofl this of one-fourth of the net profits 
of the ship to the king of Spain. Nevertheless even with 
tais drawback the opening seemed very promising. For the 
first year a supplementary license was given the English 
company to send two additional ships of six hundred ton& 
burden to encourage the commencement of the trade. (1) 
xvith this final concession the international bearing of the 
South Sea trade ceases for several years. 
Final ratification of the ^ssiento contract had not 
been accomplished by the fall of 1713. In Augtaf,Boling-
broke made a trip to u^recht to plan for this. (3) ^rthur 
Moore then took his place, and in Septembef Monfcfcleon 
complained that he saw nobody else on the subject of 
commerce. (3) It was not the ^est India trade,but trade 
with Old Spain that was causing this delay. Finally in the 
last of November,Gilligan was sent over wto establish the 
Assiento which he negotiated for",and terms were quickly 
reached without further consultation with Madrid. (4) ^fter 
(1) Anderson,op •cit,III,54r-5« 
(2) Port*MSS.V,333.Drummond to Oxford,Aug.32,1713* 
(3} Ibid, 336-8. Same to same, sept. 18,1713. 
(4) Ibid, 364-6. Same to same, No v. 30,1713. 
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more delay the commercial treaty and the contract were 
transmitted to pngland and on March 1,1714 they were 
both finally proclaimed by the firing of gund from the 
Tower.(1) 
(1) Townshend M3S.230. Secretary william B^cmley to the 
Lord Lieutenant of the Tower, 
Qhapter Six. 
SOME INTERNAL HISTORY* 
* tt* tt* n* ti* tt* n* tt* tt* 
The South Sea act had left the details of the 
subscription of stock and the organization of the company 
to be worked out by Her Majesty and Council. 
a month had expired after the passage of the act,subscriptiBD 
books were opened for the transfer of depreciated bills 
and tallies at par for south Sea certificates. From June 
39,1711 to July 30,1711,it is known that this subscription 
was in charge of John Blunt. (1) This character who was to 
achieve notoriety a decade later in connection with the 
famous south sea Bubble was as yet a ltttif known man. 
He had been a scrivener, and had been engaged in drawing 
the plans for nar^y ' 8 lottery projects,from which he had 
himself profited to a large extent. (2) Lord Oxford seems 
to have leaned heavily onrhim in<#jatoing the preliminary 
plans of the company. This gave rise to much complaint, 
1) Cal.?reas.CLXXVI, 35. Cf.ibid,CLX.,8. 
2) Pari.Hist.,VI,999,quoting from Tindal's history. 
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and was the cause of no little prejudice against the 
company at first in the City. (1) The subscriptions 
remained open until December 25,1711, and before that 
time the great mass of bills and tallies which were 
authorized to be subscribed had been turned in in payment 
for shares of south sea stock. 
in the meantime Oxford was busy considering 
various proposals of a commercial nature for the company 
to undertake. Defoe had worked out in detail a project for 
establishing a colony on the coast of Chile, and was 
demonstrating how this could be accomplished without 
giving offense to Spain in any way.(3) John frummortd was 
interesting himself in the fishing rights which the com-
pany had been granted,a$d was urging that the Greenland 
whale fishery be built up. (3) It was rumoured that 
Arthur Moore a Commissioner of Trade and Plantations 
suggested the j^ssiento contract which Oxford finally 
determined to secure*(4) 
(1) port.MSS.VII,57. Dr.Stratford to vdward Harley,gept. 
15,1711* 
(3) Ibid, V, 58-61. 
(3) Ibid,V,10-11. Drummond to Oxford,June 15,1711* 
(4) See Notes & Queries,|st series,21,157-9. 
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Before the guarantee was secured for this 
contract and before the subscriptions closed,the ministry 
seem to have found it advisable to charter their corpor-
ation, The fiscal crisis to which we have previously 
alluded may have had a determining effect on this action. (1) 
In any case, on August 15,1711,the $ueen announced her 
selection of governor and directors for the new organiza-
tion . ( 2 ) Lord Oxford himself was made first governor. 
Henry St.John the Secretary of State and Robert Benson, 
Chancellor of the exchequer were included in the director-
ate. The leading spirits of the board,if we are to believe 
opposition sentiment, were John Blunt,Arthur i$oore, and 
Sam Shepherd, the last-named being a merchant of medium 
prominence. (3) s i r james Bateman,a merchant of good 
standing in London and a whig was made sub-governor of the 
Company and active head. The balance of the board was 
made up of both ^higs and Tpries,the latter being predom-
inant. if not a purely Tory institution,the new company 
(1) See supra,pages 65 and 66. 
(3) Dictionary of national Biography,art. "Harley",XXIV,402. 
(3; "And such fair accounts the subscribers will see, 
That surely there can be nib losing; 
For ghepherd and Blunt the directors will be, 
With More of her M ys choosing. South 
Sea ballad,quoted in Notes and Queries,1st series,XI,157-9. 
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was plainly to be an organization of friends and support-
ers of the government. 
Arthur Moore of whom mention has been made, was 
unquestionably the strongest single foroe on the board 
of directors. He was a man of obscure parentage,said to be 
the son of a stable groom in Ireland. (1) By his own 
efforts he had advanced himself till in 1702 he had been 
made a director of the new joint fast India company. Since 
1707 he had been a member of parliament and since 1710 
& commissioner of Trade and Plantations. "A man of extra-
ordinary talents",declared his enemy speaker Onslowjhis 
conversation is a sort of history of the age." "He is a 
huge fellow," another contemporary described him,* and 
has a face that strikes terror into all who approadtg him." 
A certain uncouthness of habit,combined with a well-deserved 
reputation for double-dealing,kept him from mingling in t^e 
galaxy of social and literary genius which thronged the 
court of Queen Anne. 30 though his ability made him a 
force constantly to be reokoned with i n; the -conduct i of 
(1) This sketch of Moore together with other scattering 
allusions to his activities and to ballads of the time, 
is largely based on contemporary evidence gathered in 
Notes & Queries,First series,XI, 157-9,177-8,197-8. 
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public affairs in which he pparticipated,the fact that 
he was in no sense typjb al of his age has caused his 
fame to languish. But as 'prime minister of trade1, 
»le Corapte de !£ariffe,Marquis d1 assiento' as he is 
gaily styled,he must be regarded as a central figure 
in the unfoldment of the South Sea plans. It may be 
stated at the outset for the sake of clearness that 
Moore was a friend of Bolingbroke rather than of Oxford. 
This fact together with Oxford's mbending suspicion 
of fellow-ministers of questionable integrity, allows 
no room for supposing that he had any influence on 
the framing of the project prior to the passage of the 
act. 
On September 8,1711, came the charter from the 
$ue en, incorporating the "Governor and company of ^er-
fchants of Great ^ritiAn trading to the South Seas,and 
other parts of America, and for encouraging fishery." 
The patent recited the act of parliament authorizing the 
charter and proceeded to lay down regulations by which 
.business should be carried on in the court of directors 
and the general court of the company. One clause 
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provided that defaulters in resptemding to calls were 
not to be permitted to transfer their stock or receive 
dividends without the consent of the directors. It 
also specifically authorized the establishment of courts 
of law for the trial of mercantile and maritime causes, 
reserving the right of review on appeal to Rex Majesty 
and Council. (1) 
For almost a year after the granting of this char-
ter, the company so created remained a trading coporation 
in name only, with no treaty to guarantee commercial 
privileges there was no inclination to venture a cargo 
in American waters, with suspicion and jealousy of the 
Tory government rife,there was no disposition in the City 
fcut to talk down the South sea project as 1 chimericalf* 
There was additional hesitancy to making any outlay of 
new capital which would be necessary to start such a trade, 
because of the fear that all commercial rights and corporate 
identity might be swept away by the repayment of the 
principal of the original debts. 
(1) Anderson,op.cit.ITI* > *.. 
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The government,as we have Already seen, (1) had 
"been ir the meantime seising upon the fact of the existence 
of the south sea stock as a basis for extending its 
credit. In pursuance of this deiign,on May 13,1713 an 
amendment was added to the pending lottery bill which 
made it lawful for paymasters and treasurers of the 
government offices to borrow money at six per cent on the 
security of shares of South Sea stock which might be in 
their possession. (3) Sir james ĵ ateman seized the oppor<~ 
tunity to propose another amendment granting the South 
Sea Company a perpetual charter. |fter discussion the 
proposal was withdrawn* The same day,however,permission 
was granted to Bateman,Annesley,william Lowndes, Audi tor 
Harley and the Chancellor of the exchequer to bring in a 
separate bill to the same effect. (3) The following day 
such a bill was introduced by Governor Bateman(4)j it 
was r*ad the second time on May 16; and on May 27 and June 
2,it was considered in the committee of th%*^hole. (5) 
(1) See supra, chapter IV,especially pages 67 and 68* 
(3) 10 ^nne c. 19,sees. 185 and 186. 




Evidently considerable opposition had been aroused,and 
it may be safely assumed that the whole policy ofl the 
government with regard to the trade in question was 
subjected to searching criticism. A report with amend-
ments was finally agreed to on June 5; the bill passed 
the Commons on the seventh. (1) The Lords approved the 
bill on June 11,and the Qx een signed it on June 21.(3) 
As the passage of the one new provjs ion had 
proved of assistance to the government in fiscal matters, 
so the granting of a perpetual charter was a great 
stimulus to tttfc activity of the company itself. Its 
stock immediately advanced ,and the court of directors 
began to consider the advisability of commencing a trade 
that summer, (3) Although peace was not yet agreed upon, 
there was a temporary cessation of hostilities and the 
occasion seemed favorable. a good market for bonds was 
in prospect* 
It seems reasonable to suppose,however,that no 
definite steps to this qpd would have been taken had not 
the government interested itself directly in the matter. 
1) Comm.Journ.XVII,255,261. 
2} Lord1s Journ.XIX,478. Comm.Journ.XVII,274. 
3) Anderson,op,cit.Ill,45. 
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In July, 1712, Drummond had advised Oxford that the Dutch 
b«P oraing more eager for peace would not object to a free 
and open trade to Spain for English ships, and he urg# 
11 some noise about a great sea equipage,w (l) it was a 
valuable suggestion. The French were to be driven out 
of the west Indian trade. Naturally the first of the 
allies in the marjtffct would reap the harvest. The 
government must offer positive inducements to the 
Company if necessary to get them to start their $rade« 
accordingly St,John wrote the court of directors that 
"for the jnibll® %ood of the nation,and the particular 
advantage of this company,her Majesty has been pleased 
to assist them with a sufficient force in order to their 
making a settlement in the South Seas for the security 
and better carrying out the trade to those parts".(2) 
what this asistance was appears from a letter of thanks 
written by Sir /mbrose Crowley on behalf of the court, o 
thanking her Majesty for the two ships ordered to take 
their goods on boaardr. (3) The court resolved to carry on 
the trade the first year with a cargo worth 200,000 pounds 
1) port,MSS. V,208, ^rummond to Oxford,July 29,1712. 
2) Quoted in Burton:Reian of Queen &nne,II,33&S 
(3) Cal,^reas,CLII,36, Dated October 1,1712. 
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and for Ifchis purpose there had already been issued that 
amount in bonds under the company1s seal.(l) 
although the goods and supplies were bought,the 
expddition never started. / strong reactionary movement 
headed by whig agitators had be?run.iin the Company 
ajainst trading at all. jt was declared that Parliament 
would be petitioned to release the corporation from 
such an obligation; that the cargoes would be sold; that 
the stockholders would be satisfied with their six per 
cent interest from the government. The ptlipose of 
these stories may have been only to depress the stock 
market and induce Dutch investors to part with their 
holdings. (2) yet division of opinion was no doubt very 
natural near the time for the first election of direc-
tors for the company, ^s the second election was held on 
the first day of 1714,it is reasonable to assume that this 
date had been firfd for the regular election, Despite the 
efforts of "enemies to starve and friends to overlay" 
the project in the choice of directors,Oxford1 s influence 
?3) port.MSS. V,364. Drummond to Oxford,Nov.28,1713.Drum-
mond is reporting some of the s tories circulated in 
Flanders bv a certain Lieutenant-Qeneral. 
' • , V .... -1 -
(1) Anderson*,op.cit. 111*45-6. 
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was successful in securing the selection of very moder-
ate Tory merchants with a mixture of fhigs . advisers 
had urged upon him the necessity of selecting'men of 
undoubted property'.(1) Oxford seems to have remained 
as governor of the company, certainly the close of 
the year found the affairs of the company in better shap 
than ever. Through November and pecember,17l2 there was 
on the whole a rise of stock and many entertained the 
hope that it would reach par before Parliament met.(2) 
This it did not do. However toward the close of the 
succeeding year after the announcement of the Assiento 
contract,stock was quoted at 94̂ -. (3) 
In March, 1713, Lexington and Gilligan had con-
cluded their negotiations at Madrid. By the contract 
they signed,King Philip had reserved for himself outright 
one-fourth of the net profits of the annual ship which he 
allowed the English 'assientists' to send. It was left with 
the pueen to designate the persons to whom the contract 
should be entrusted. The south Sea company,of course, had 
(1) Port.MSS. V,253. John Toland to Oxford. 1712.Full of 
advice with regard to the approaching election. 




been intended from the first as the ultimate recipient of 
the benefits of trade. Indeed by virtue of its charter, 
all other parties were barred from engaging in this 
trade or any trade south of the Orinoco. But there were 
persons in vngland who were watchful of every opportunity 
to profit from the valuable concession in the gift of 
the Queen. 
Not until JJune 2,1713 did the Earl of oxford 
inform the court of directors of the South sea Company 
that her Majesty had been pleased to confer the benefits 
of the contract upon them, and had also secured the ^rant 
of special licenses for two 690-ton vessels to open up the 
trade to the Indies the first year. "Flushed with such 
pompous appearances",recites our chronicler, (1) the 
company "issued 200,000 pounds more in bonds Her 
Majesty lent two of her own ships to be the two licensed 
ships for carrying over the company's goods,factors and 
servants." Once again all seemed in readiness to commence 
tne trade that was to bring wealth and industry to England, 
fame and honour to the statesmen and projectors whose 
foresight had made the undertaking possible. 
(1) jmderson, op. cit.III, 55. 
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Then the directors suddenly awoke to the fact that 
in addition to the quarter of the profits of the general 
trade reserved to the King of Spain,her Majesty had reserved 
to herself or her assigns another quarter, and had in 
addition granted per cent of the net returns to 
Manasses Gilligan,the obscure but obliging agent who had 
conducted the negotiation of the contract and the accom-
panying commercial treaty.(1) This checked proceedings 
and a year elapsed before the situation could be adjusted. 
At first it seems that the Queen intimated the 
possibility of trading herself separately as a co-partner 
of the Company. (2) This obviously could only be a blind 
to render more plausible the compromise to which she 
finally yielded assent. Her reserved quarter of the contract, 
exclusive of the Gilligan grant, should be made over to 
certain individuals whom she might designate. (3) It was 
understood that they would become members of the South Sea 
Company,contributing to the joint-stock for carrying on 
the trade in proportion to their share in the net profits, 
and subject to the Companyf8 rules. 
(1) Anderson,op.cit.Ill,55. 
(2) Lords Journ.XIX,756. Dissent of the Whig Lords from 
the vote on a censure of the government,July 8,1714. 
(3) Ibid. 
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Who fthe assigns1 of the oueen might be was never 
openly declared, ^lthough for a year the South Sea court 
carried on a struggle diplomatic, judicial and finally 
political to mak* a satisfactory adjustment of its claims 
with respect to those of the queen*s assigns,the official 
records are silent as to the identity of the parties. 
True the nueen made over all her rights in a formal 
manner to Messrs.Lowndes and Taylor,both of whom held 
subordinate offices in the treasury department. But before 
the contest ended both declared that they were but 1 dummy1 
holders for persons unknown to themselves, and that after 
arrangements were made they expected to "declare a trust* 
This circumstance had long been suspected and gossip was 
very ready with the names of %he prospective assignees. 
Lord Bolingbroke,Lady Masham and ^rthur Moore were the 
inner group whose persona] fortunes were said to be intended 
by the device*(2) 
There can be little doubt but that the version of 
contemporary rumour was substantially correct. The operation 
of this little group of 'higher-ups* would probably form 
(1) Lords Journ.XIX,755,756. 
(2) Anderson,op? cit,III,55. 
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a most interesting series of episodes to be ferreted out 
by socialist historians with an eye for the 'graft-motive'. 
If one is to believe the statements of Lord Oxford,these 
persons had been disappointed at not being able to profit 
by speculation at the time of the passage of the south 
Sea act. To accept his testimony again,the Hill exped-
ition to Canada had been made the oigect of personal 
profit amounting to some 22,000 pounds for this same 
(1) 
group. Oxford was now to thwart them in their purpose of 
sharing the ^ssiento profits. Various accounts are given 
of the manner in which it was planned to divide the 
Queen1 s fourth of the profits. (2) ^nd it may be said 
with some degree of certainty that Bolingbroke,Moore and 
Lady Masham were to have shares and the Oxford was offered 
a share for his good offices in bringing the transaction 
about. He refused to participate and from that time, it 
would seem, dates the suspicion with which he was regarded 
by his former political allies. 
Before the question of division of profits was 
again brought to the attention of the Company, there was 
cites these from "Mrs.A.O." See also letter of Bothmar 




a reorganization in the management* ĵ t the annual election 
the first of 1714,the whig element among the stockholders 
gained control at last. Oxford was not re-elected 
governor; sir James Bateman was again chosen sub-governor. 
The active control of the commercial interests of the 
Company was entrusted to the hands of a committee of 
directors including Sam shepherd,Sir Samuel clark*8ir 
Theodore Janssen, and Messrs.Harcaurt Asters,William 
Chapman and John Blufc*. (1) 
On Wednesday,Feb,17,1714,the formal proposals of 
the assiento as finally designed by the Queen were 
considered before the general court of the Company. (2) 
The court was now informed that her aswigns would trad© 
upon the same basis which she herself would have been on 
had she undertaken the trade herself. The company was 
entrusted with all the initiative of the enterprise. It 
was to plan all ventures and apparently to advance all 
capital for their vndertakings. (3) At this the company 
(1) Lords Journ*XIX,755. Cf.Diet,Nat.Biog.XXIV,402. 
Port.MSS.V,471. "News Letter" dated July 8,1714 refers to 
the court as made up of a majority of whigs. 
(2) port.MSS.V,385. Mathew Decker to Thomas Harley,Feb. 19, 
1714. 
(3) Lords Journ.XIX?756. 
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balke & Heated debate arose in the meeting, and an 
adjourned aeesion was held a week later. 
At this juncture a !noble Lord1,possiblyt the Lord 
Treasurer himself, intervened and suggested that the 
Company take the matter up directly with the assigns of 
the oueen. And to accomplish this,proceedings were begun 
by the trustees of the assigns in chancery. Issue was 
reached over the demand of the counsel for the Company 
that binding promises be made by the unknown assignees 
for advancing their share of the joint capital. This was 
stoutly resisted,and finally when it appeared that the 
Company was fighting against only 1 straw men1,the direct-
ors were advised » that it was not safe for the Company 
to accept the Assiento upon those terms,it being liable 
to all the objections that were made to the proposition 
a year before."(1) while these proceedings were in prog-
ress, according to sworn testimony, Moore approached several 
of his fellow-directors suggesting that they attempt to 
give the assignees a sum of money outright in return for 
their interest in the ^ssiento. 
(1) Lords Journ.XIX,755. 
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The opening up of the trade to the south Seas had 
been obliged to wait for the outcome ofthese transactions. 
Indeed the Company had proposed "that the two ships should 
be dispatched,which were to take place even before the 
peace,that the cargo they had provided might have been 
sent away,to be there at the fair,when the falleons #l$ch 
were then sailing should arrive." But the cargoes of the 
Company lay useless through all this negotiation,yielding 
no return on the investmentwwhile the advantages of being 
first in the market at the close of the war were entirely 
lost. The ships lay in harbor already to sail when this 
turn in the negotiations brought them to a stop. 
Doubtless it was owinj to the public interest which 
was involved in this circumstance, that the House of 
Commons on June §^1714, sought to bring to an end the pro-
tracted struggle. In a humble address to the qpiieen,the 
Corrmons prayed that all rights and advantages to which 
her Majesty might be or might become entitled by virtue 
of agreemtn with his Catholic Majesty should "be disposed 
of for the use of the public and Awards discharging the 
debts of the nation". (1) The wishes of the commons were 
(1) Comm.Journ.XVII,673. 
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not realized. But the overwhelming public sentiment 
which this action voiced against entrusting any part of 
the oontract to private individuals forced tbfe Queen to 
take decisive action to stop the dissension, accordingly 
on June 22 secretary Bromley acquainted the House that 
her Majesty had been pleased to surrender her fourth part 
of the contract to the south Sea Co up any itself, jftex a 
division of 168-139,the House voted its thanks to her 
Majesty for the act.(l) 
,rthur Moore and his fellow conspirators had 
failed to accomplish their deBign on the assiento. 
But the final withdrawal from them of all hope of profiting 
from the south sea trade was but a premonition of more 
trouble to follow. Suspicions had been aroused by the 
secretive character of the Assiento transactions which led 
to the ifiost thorough probing of the conduct of Moore 
hinself,an investigation which only narrowly escaped being 
directed against Bolingbroke himself. 
Susplfcton had first been brought to bear on Moore 
early in the spring when the committee of public accounts 
(1) Comm. journ. XVII, 695-6. 
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reported abuses on hij part as far back as 1706. In that 
year Moore,as controller of the accounts for the army, had 
contracted for extensive clothing contracts for the 
army through a fdummyf. In addition to the bad principle 
involved in the transaction on its face,the committee 
pointed out that nearly four thousand gptonds had been 
charged the government on account of the contract for which 
no clothing had been ordered at all. Moore only made bad 
matters warrse by explaining tiya/t most of this went to the 
colonels of the different regiments as a gratuity. The 
committtee made no recommendations to the commons, but 
(i) 
avowed the opinion that the affair'was most extraordinary1. 
This revelation,however,was followed shortly by 
an exposure of underhanded dealings in connection with 
the South Sea Company itself,which resulted in Moorefs 
expulsion from the board of director!. The charges were in 
brief that he had attempted to smuggle merchandise aboard 
the first ship of the company bound for America. Complaint 
was entered against Moore before the court of directors by 




had been lent by her Jiajesty to the Company. The Bedford 
was in the Downs in May, 1714,ready to leave with a cargo 
for Carthagena and under orders to stop at Cadiz to take 
on board the Prince of San Bueno,Viceroy of Peru and the 
Marquis of Villa Rocha,Governor of Panama. Moore approaqgied 
the captain seeking to bribe him to allow him to load on 
the ship twenty or thirty tons of linen from Holland, These 
goods Moore in partnership with a Mr, Da Costa wished to dis-
pose of in the west Indies. Irritated at the pressure that 
was brought to bear on him, the captain reported the affair 
to the directors. From May 17 to July 7,1714,the court 
held several sittings at which the matter was considered. 
It appears from the recsdrds that Moore,Da Costa,and a 
Mr.Dowdall were summoned as witnesses,and finally the court 
found Moore guilty of a breach of trust and incapable of 
holding Any office in the company thereafter. It w^s thought 
by many at the time that Moore had been treated unfairly; 
had not been allowed to make an adequate defense;*1 and the 
accused appearing less guilty than they made him was 
thought to be more innocent" than he was.(l) 
(1) Swift Correap,II,175-7,Charles Ford to Swift,July 10, 
1714. For other details of this affair see Pari.Hist.71, 
1363; news letters in Port.MSS.V,471; account by Templeton, 
a South Sea clerk written in 1735,in Notes & Queries,1st 
Series,XI,Hf7-8; official proceedings of the court of 
directors in Cal.Treas 
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The action of the South Sea Company in this patter, 
aside from the palpable misconduct of Moore,drew its 
neatest importance from the fact that simultaneously a 
thorough investigation of the negotiations with Spain 
was being made in the House of Lords, when the Spanish 
treaty had come back with f nal ratifications from Utrecht 
in February, 1714,it had been amended by the addition of 
three explanatory articles dealing with the conditions of 
English trade with Old Spain. These articles immediate-
ly proved a considerable hindrance to British trade. The 
charge was made that Moore,who had been prominently con-
cerned in dictating the terras of the treaty, and others 
higher up had profited largely in a personal way from the 
alterations. Lord Oxford himself gave suggestions to the 
promoters of the investigation,which aided greatly in 
determining the course which the inquiry might most profit-
ably take.(l) 
As early as June 33,the Lords voted to fix a day 
to begin the questioning of witnesses and the examination 
of papers. (3) Hot until a week later did the inquiry actuall y 
(1) Macpherson Papers,II ,Bothmar to Robethon, July 13,1714* 
Had Oxford been willing to support the investigation to the 
end it might have been turned against Bolingbroke, 
(2) Bords Journ.XIX,?37* 
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begin. (1) 3y July 2,Monckton,one of the Commissioners of 
Trade,was ready to tell of the vast amount of discretion 
which had been allowed Moore by his fellows. They had 
not even seen the final draft of the treaty till it was 
printed. (2) Three days ilater the Lords resolved to present 
an address to the cueen expressing the insuperable diffic-
ulties under which trade with Spain lay by the present 
treaty. (3) The following day proved the most fruitful day 
so far in the inquiry. All the commissioners and clerks in 
the department of trade were summoned before the Lords. 
One of the clerks found himstflf quite sure he had seen a 
letter to Moore giving him assurances that he would be 
rewarded when the new articles of commerce were agreed to. 
But what was a new disclosure to most people was made when t 
developed that the King of Spain had employed Moore,an 
English government official and director of the South Sea 
Company,to be his agent in administering his interests in 
the Assiento Contract.(*) The inquiry was continued till 
July 8 when after thorough examination of former witnesses 
and a committee of South Sea direct ors,the Lords felt 
(1) Lords Journ.XIX,737. 
(2) Ibid,741. For his pains Monckton's dismissal was all 
prepared when the death of the Queen saved him his office. 
(3) Ibid,746. The Queen politely answered that she could 
attend to her own business, 
(4) Ibid,749. Gilligan was associated with him in the 
agency. 
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themselves ready to take definite action of some kind. 
The producing of two promissor notes to Queen Anne from the 
King of Spain,convening to the former such interest as he 
had in the Assiento,presumably as security for a loan, 
revived the problem of settling the south Sea trade. (1) 
And to this,rather than to definite censure of Arthur 
*<oore,the Lords turned their attention. Doubtless the 
fact that he had been expelled from the south Sea direct-
orate on the preceding day was an inducement to the peers 
to neglect to pass censure on him. 
Cowper leading the debate declared that "the un-
certainty and suspense in which the South Sea Company had 
a long time been kept,whether her Majesty would retain to 
herself or give to the Company her quarter part of the 
Assiento reserved to her, had been a principal obstruction 
to the Company's carrying on a trade*.(2) It was ^harton 
who made the motion that the Queen be petitioned to grant 
to the Company the 7^ per cent which had been reserved to 
gilligan as well as her own one-fourth. This was voted 
down 5o to 43.(3) A motion to ask for such a grant of all 
rights which the Queen might obtain from the King of 
1) Lords Journ.XIX,755. 
2) Pari.Hist.VI,1362-3. 
3} Ibid. Cf.Lords Journ. XIX,755-6 for proceedings of the day 
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Spain by agreement was also voted down. A like fate 
befell a motion to declare that the benefits mnd advant-
ages of the South Sea trade had been much obstructed by 
the endeavors dT private persons to secure private gain.(l) 
At last the motion of Abingdon c a r r i e d , i * e . t o thank 
her Majesty for the grant of her quartr of the net profits 
and for the licenses for the two additional ships, and to 
request that she dispose of such other advantages as might 
be vested in her for the use of the public. "The vote stood 
56 to 40 in favor of this address. (3) On the following day 
the oueen thanked the Lords,intimating that she would 
do as she pleased. She then prorogue* Parliament,before 
it took any further action* (3) Plainly advisers who 
stood in danger of suffering from further investigation 
had the ear of the Oueen in directing these actions. 
The South Sea Company had not even yet decided to 
accept the Assiento Contract.However on the evening of 
July 19,its representatives waited on the oueen to thank 
her for giving them her fourth share of the Assiento* (4) 
(1) Lords Journ* XIX,756. Twenty noble Lords signed a 
protest on this action,setting forth the facts on which 
they based their iissent. 
(3) Ibid. 
(3) Lords Journ* XIX,758. Parl.Hiat.VI.1363. 
(4) Port.M83.V,473* 'News LetterT Julf 30,1714. 
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In reply her Majesty thanked them for their address,wished 
them good success in carrying on their trade andhoped 
they would make better use than they hitherto had of what 
she had bestowed on them.(1) The formal conferring of the 
grant was delayed till after the death of the Queen and it 
remained for King George to give official confirmation to 
the final concession to the Company.(2) 
With the death of Queen Anne begins a new chaptei 
in the history of the south Sea Company, with other stocks, 
the shares of this company rose apace at the peaceful 
accession of King George. At peace for the first time in 
years both at home and abroad,trade and commerce rapidly 
expanded,industry developed, and the south sea Company 
began strenuous efforts to establish a permanent basis for 
it* eommercial activities. That they resulted in compar-
ative failure cannot be ascribed to any lack of merit in 
the project itself or to any lack of diligence on the 
part of the directors in charge. Annoying and unfair 
treatment on the part of Spanish officials in the west 
(1) Port.MSS.V,»74.«Hews Letter1 July 22,1714. 
(2) Anderson,op.cit.Ill,62. 
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Indies so hampered the trade as to render it practically 
worthless for many years. The two ships,Bedford and 
Catherine,which finally sailed in 1714 to open up the 
trade for the Company, both suffered from these breaches 
of contract. The first-named was confiscated on a false 
charge of being overloaded and the other was subjected to 
heavy duties at Vera Cruz.(l) After so much toil,such 
endless bickering, such jealousy of allies abroad and 
covetousness of officials at home,the South Sea trade 
seemed not to be worth the cost* 
But we have already transgressed the bounds which 
had been set for this study. With the formal grant of the 
entire English share in the Assiento to the South Sea 
Company and the departure of the two licensed ships for 
Carthagena and Vera Cruz to open up the long-hoped for 
r;outh 3ea trade,the formative period of the. eompany comes 
to an end. Of its two great objects,the Company had 
from its inception operated to stimulate the credit of 
the government. The rise of its stock above par at the 
accession of King George gave public notice that the 
(1) Anderson,op.cit.Ill,79-80. These acts and many others 
in following years became ground for complaint at the 
time of the"outbreak of hostilities with Spain in 1718. 
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purpose of preventing the discount of unsecured debts had 
been completely accomplished. The second and,as we 
have seen, incidental object,the development of the 
South sea trade, the company had just started on its 
mission to attain. And as the ships lent it by her 
Majesty for the first voyage sailed downtthe harbor of 
Portsmouth, there seemed no reason in the world to 
doubt tthfltb in this end it would be equally successful. 
o 
